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Abstract 
 
Event studies, a half-century-old approach to measuring the effect of events 
on stock prices, are now ubiquitous in securities fraud litigation. In 
determining whether the event study demonstrates a price effect, expert 
witnesses typically base their conclusion on whether the results are 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, a threshold that is 
drawn from the academic literature. As a positive matter, this represents a 
disconnect with legal standards of proof. As a normative matter, it may 
reduce enforcement of fraud claims because litigation event studies 
typically involve quite low statistical power even for large-scale frauds.  
 
This paper, written for legal academics, judges, and policy makers, makes 
three contributions. First, it contributes to a nascent literature 
demonstrating that the standard event-study methodology can be 
problematic in securities litigation. In particular, the paper documents the 
tradeoff between power and confidence level and the ensuring impact on the 
likelihood that valid claims of fraud will erroneously be rejected.  In so 
doing, the article highlights that the choice of confidence level is a policy 
judgment about the appropriate balance between the costs of litigation and 
the costs of securities fraud.  Second, the article argues that the SEC has 
both the legal power and the institutional competence to develop litigation 
standards that balance these costs.   
 
Third, the article provides a novel and feasible framework through which 
the SEC can implement such litigation standards. The framework relies on 
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an assessment of the defendant firm’s market capitalization and abnormal 
returns distribution to determine the maximum confidence level (minimum 
significance level) that is consistent with the minimum required power of 
detecting a fraud of the benchmark magnitude.  The SEC is uniquely 
positioned to make this determination based on the information it possesses 
about the level of fraud in the capital markets and the role of private 
litigation in deterring fraud.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Event studies, a statistical tool borrowed from the financial 
economics literature, are “standard operating procedure in federal securities 
litigation.”1  The purpose of an event study is to measure the extent to 
which stock prices react to the release of new information into the market.  
In securities fraud cases, event studies are used in several ways, including 
analyzing the efficiency of the market in which the securities trade,2 
measuring the price impact of the fraudulent disclosures,3 determining 
whether there is a causal relationship between the fraud and the plaintiffs’ 
economic losses4 and computing the amount of damages.5  Although courts 
vary in the extent to which they require the use of an event study and the 
degree to which they accept other evidence with respect to these issues, a 
properly-conducted event study is often a critical factor.6 
The structure of an event study involves distinguishing between 
normal fluctuations in stock price and a so-called abnormal return 
associated with the release of material information about the company by a 
 
1 In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 253-54 (2d Cir. 2016). 
2 See, e.g., Di Donato v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160736, *26-
27 (using event studies to evaluate market efficiency). 
3 See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. Tex. 2015) 
(using event studies to determine price impact). 
4 Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int'l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 752 
F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2014) (“The usual -- it is fair to say ‘preferred’ -- method of proving loss 
causation in a securities fraud case is through an event study, in which an expert determines 
the extent to which the changes in the price of a security result from events such as disclosure 
of negative information about a company, and the extent to which those changes result from 
other factors.”). 
5 See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (discussing 
the role of event studies in calculating damages). 
6 See, e.g., Goldkrantz v. Griffin, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4445 (S.D.N.Y.) (granting 
defendants summary judgment on negative loss causation affirmative defense where expert 
examined statistically significant residual returns identified by “’standard' 95% confidence 
interval,’ used index of peer stock firms, and assumed market efficiency; and plaintiff's 
expert ‘conducted no independent statistical analysis’ of defendant's stock”). 
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process known as hypothesis testing.  An event study seeks to determine 
whether to reject the so-called null hypothesis – that the price movements in 
question fall within some measure of normal limits.  It concludes that a 
stock price movement is likely to have been caused by a disclosure if the 
size of the stock price reaction is sufficiently outside the normal or expected 
range of stock price fluctuations, a price movement that we have termed, in 
other work, “highly unusual.”7   
In the academic literature from which the event study methodology 
is drawn, the basis for inferring a causal relationship is most commonly a 
confidence level of 95%.  A finding of a 95% probability that the stock 
price movement resulted from the disclosure as opposed to happening by 
chance is termed “statistically significant.”  This requirement of a 95% 
confidence level has been imported into the law.8  Courts have repeatedly 
held that a “properly conducted” event study demonstrating a statistically 
significant price effect is necessary to establish or rebut key elements of a 
securities fraud claim.9  Similarly, courts have rejected efforts to establish 
those elements that fail to establish a causal relationship at the 95% 
confidence level.10 
While courts have embraced the event study methodology, they 
have paid limited attention to the question of whether the social science 
standard of statistical significance and the requirement of the 95% 
confidence level are appropriate standards for legal sufficiency.  In this 
Article, we argue that they are not.  We focus, in particular, on an issue that 
the courts have mostly overlooked, the relationship between confidence 
 
7 Jill Fisch, Jonah Gelbach, & Jonathan Klick, The Logic and Limits of Event Studies in 
Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEXAS L. REV. 553  (2018).  See also Michael J. Kaufman & 
John Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role of Event Studies In Securities 
Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 193-94 (2009) (The “excess price 
movement is tested for statistical significance to see whether the result is unusual or unlikely 
to be explained by the normal random variations of the stock price”). A different 
methodological approach from conventional hypothesis testing is Bayesian hypothesis 
testing. To our knowledge this approach has not been used in securities litigation; see Jonah 
B. Gelbach & Jenny R. Hawkins, A Bayesian Approach to Event Studies for Securities 
Litigation, ___ J. INST’L & THEOR. ECON. ___ (2020). 
8 See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 262 (N.D. Tex. 
2015) (“To show that a corrective disclosure had a negative impact on a company's share 
price, courts generally require a party's expert to testify based on an event study that meets 
the 95% confidence standard, which means "one can reject with 95% confidence the null 
hypothesis that the corrective disclosure had no impact on price."). 
9 See, e.g., Carpenters Pension Trust Fund of St. Louis v. Barclays PLC, 310 F.R.D. 69, 
95 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (describing the role of “a properly conducted event study” in establishing 
price impact); United States v. Hatfield, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174947, *18 (E.D.N.Y,) 
(observing that “a properly conducted event study” was necessary to determine the amount 
of investors’ losses in criminal securities fraud case). 
10 See infra notes 32 through 35 and accompanying text. 
4 POWER AND STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE [13-Apr-20 
level and power.  As we explain, the confidence level controls the 
probability of rejecting non-meritorious claims—cases in which the 
disclosure in question did not, in fact, cause a stock price reaction.  Power 
addresses a complementary concern—erroneous rejection of meritorious 
claims.  As we explain, the structure of an event study presents a tradeoff 
between confidence level and power.  Specifically, the requirement that 
event studies establish a causal relationship at the 95% confidence level 
leads to low power in many situations.  As a result, when courts require 
event studies that meet the standard of a 95% confidence level, there is a 
high likelihood that they will reject a substantial number of cases of true 
fraud.11 
The tradeoff that we highlight between confidence level and power 
demonstrates that the choice of what confidence level to use in securities 
fraud litigation is not a matter of objective scientific truth.  Instead, the 
choice reflects an implicit normative judgment about the appropriate level 
of difficulty required to establish a securities fraud claim.  As we elaborate, 
the concept of statistical significance involves a fundamental policy choice 
between reducing the risk of imposing liability for a disclosure that did not 
affect stock prices and increasing the likelihood that defendants will be held 
accountable for fraudulent disclosures.  In their use of the event study 
methodology and reliance on the social science literature, the courts have 
not confronted this policy choice directly.12 
Having revealed the policy choice inherent in the use of statistical 
significance, it becomes clear that securities litigation should not borrow 
unthinkingly from empirical practice in the social sciences but instead 
determine the appropriate threshold of statistical significance based on the 
tradeoff between these competing concerns.  We therefore consider which 
part of our system of securities regulation is best suited to make this policy 
choice from the perspective of comparative institutional competence. 
Although Article III courts currently handle this decision implicitly by the 
standards they impose on the admissibility and persuasiveness of expert 
testimony, we argue that they are not well situated to do so.  Federal judges 
are poorly positioned to weigh the policy considerations reflected by the 
tradeoff between confidence level and power and to consider the impact that 
shifting the extent of the tradeoff will have on the deterrence of fraud and 
 
11 See, e.g., Taylor Dove & J.B. Heaton, Bias-Corrected Estimation of Price Impact in 
Securities Litigation, 21 AM. LAW ECON. REV. 184 (2019) (“a consequence of the low 
statistical power of single-firm event studies is that many smaller (but still economically 
important) securities frauds will go undetected because they do not reach statistical 
significance.”) 
12 See Jonah B. Gelbach, Estimation Evidence, 168 U. Pa. L. R. ___ (2020) for a 
discussion of the disconnect between use of academic standards of statistical significance 
and stated litigation standards. 
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the promotion of market integrity.  Although the policy analysis we 
describe could be conducted by Congress, we argue that Congress lacks 
both the expertise and the political will to make this determination, and that 
monitoring the market’s response is also likely to require a level of 
flexibility and adjustment that one-off legislation is poorly suited to 
provide.  
As a result, we argue that the Securities & Exchange Commission 
(SEC) should decide the appropriate level of statistical significance to be 
used in securities litigation event studies.  We argue that balancing litigation 
costs against fraud costs is precisely the type of determination that expert 
administrative agencies were designed to make.  The SEC is well suited to 
make this determination based both on the technical expertise of its staff of 
economists as well as its familiarity with the role of private enforcement in 
serving the objectives of the federal securities laws.  The SEC also has 
unique access to data that allows it to evaluate the costs involved and the 
flexibility to adjust its rule in response to changes in market conditions or 
the behavior of market participants. We therefore call upon the SEC to 
engage in formal rulemaking to evaluate the applicable policy 
considerations and to set the level of statistical significance necessary for an 
acceptable event study in securities fraud litigation.    
We conclude by offering a feasible framework that the SEC can use 
in determining the appropriate tradeoff between power and confidence 
level. This approach is based on ensuring that a minimum level of power is 
obtained for a benchmark fraud magnitude, based on the SEC’s judgment 
about the level of enforcement necessary to provide sufficient deterrence of 
fraud. Given knowledge of the defendant firm’s market capitalization and 
abnormal returns distribution, it is straightforward to determine the 
maximum confidence level (minimum significance level) that is consistent 
with the minimum required power of detecting a fraud of the benchmark 
magnitude.  
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we provide a 
brief overview of the current role of event studies in securities fraud 
litigation.  In Part II, we explain in more detail the idea of statistical 
significance, and its conceptual twin, the confidence level.  We also 
introduce and describe the tradeoff between the confidence level used in an 
event study and the power of that study, a tradeoff that highlights the 
implicit policy judgment reflected in the use of the 95% confidence level by 
the courts.13 Part III explains that, because of the policy considerations 
reflected in the choice of the 95% confidence level, its use by the courts 
reflects a normative judgment rather than merely some technical inquiry.  
 
13 Equivalently, the tradeoff between Type I and Type II error rates. 
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We argue that the courts and Congress are poorly positioned to make this 
normative judgment. Instead, we argue that this determination should be 
made by the SEC through formal notice-and-comment rulemaking.  Finally, 
Part IV suggests a framework for the SEC to choose the confidence level in 
a way that consciously takes into account the tradeoff between confidence 
level and power.  
 
I. EVENT STUDIES AND SECURITIES LITIGATION: THE STATE OF PLAY 
 
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the fraud on 
the market presumption that stock prices, in an efficient market, reflect 
material public disclosures.14  As a result, Basic enabled private securities 
fraud claims to be brought as class actions as long as the plaintiffs could 
establish that the fraudulent disclosures affected stock price.  In Dura, the 
Supreme Court cautioned, however, that it was legally insufficient for 
plaintiffs to prove that they had purchased stock at a price artificially 
inflated by fraud; plaintiffs were also required to establish a causal 
relationship between the fraud and their subsequent economic harm,15 a 
requirement known as “loss causation.”16 
Litigants now introduce event studies to address the requirements of 
both Basic and Dura.17  Event studies, which seek to measure the extent to 
which stock prices respond to disclosures, are used to support plaintiffs’ 
claim, pursuant to Basic, that the securities in question traded in an efficient 
market.  Similarly, event studies are used in court to prove or refute the 
claim that a particular fraudulent disclosure affected market price – a 
requirement that the Supreme Court subsequently termed “price impact.”18  
In Halliburton II, the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the ability of 
defendants to defeat class certification by introducing event studies 
demonstrating the absence of price impact.19 Finally, to address the concern 
identified in Dura, litigants introduce event studies to address loss 
 
14 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
15 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005). 
16 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(4) (requiring plaintiffs to establish loss 
causation).   
17 See Fisch et al., supra note 7 at 560-62 (describing role of event studies in addressing 
the requirements of Basic and Dura). 
18 See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 277 (2014) (defining 
price impact as proof “that a defendant’s misrepresentation actually affected the stock”). 
19 Id. at 280, 283. For a useful discussion of Halliburton II’s technical requirements, see 
Merritt B. Fox, Halliburton II: It All Depends on What Defendants Need to Show to Establish 
No Impact on Price, 70 BUS. LAW. 437 (2015). 
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causation, most commonly by evaluating the effect on market price of a 
disclosure revealing or correcting a prior fraudulent statement.20  Although 
securities fraud cases rarely go to trial and, as a result, judicial efforts to 
calculate damages are virtually non-existent, litigants also proffer event 
studies with respect to damages on motions for summary judgment21 as well 
as at the motion for class certification in response to Rule 23’s requirement 
that damages be reasonably ascertainable.22 Moreover, plaintiffs’ decisions 
whether to litigate fraud claims are made in the shadow of prevailing 
judicial standards; thus, they are unlikely even to file a complaint unless 
they can support their claims with an event study likely to pass muster 
under prevailing standards.   
Courts have varied widely in their evaluation and use of the event study 
methodology.23 Within this variation, however, courts generally recognize 
the need to determine whether an event study constitutes reliable evidence 
with respect to the question for which it is introduced, that is, whether the 
event study supports (or refutes) the claimed relationship between a 
disclosure and a stock price movement.24  Central to that task is the concept 
of statistical significance.25 
In the social science literature from which the event study methodology 
is drawn, the results of hypothesis testing depend on the likelihood that an 
outcome as extreme as the one observed would occur by chance, given that 
no effect of interest had actually occurred. Mapping that into the event 
study context, the question is how probable it would be to observe as large a 
price drop if the stock price was actually not affected by an alleged 
 
20 See, e.g., In re Novatel Wireless Secs. Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154599, *15-16 
(S.D. Cal.) (“Event studies are crucial to demonstrate loss causation, and indeed some courts 
describe them as ‘almost obligatory.’”), quoting In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Lit., 605 
F. Supp. 2d 586, (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
21 See, e.g., In re Imperial Credit Indus. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1016 (C.D. 
Cal. 2003 (granting summary judgment for defendants where plaintiffs failed to introduce an 
event study to determine damages). 
22  See Novatel, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *16 (observing that “The absence of an event 
study for damages, in particular, will result in summary judgment in favor of defendants”). 
23 In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Sec. Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48057, *70 (S.D. Fl.) 
(observing that “the greater weight of authority as reflected in many of the circuit and district 
court opinions that have followed Dura and are cited herein, is that a securities-fraud plaintiff 
can satisfy his burden of proving loss causation only by producing the testimony of an expert 
who has completed a reliable multiple-regression analysis, event study, and financial analysis 
in order to quantify the extent to which the claimed losses are the result of the alleged 
fraud.”). 
24 See, e.g., Ohio Pub. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 137229 (N.D. Ohio) (“Statistical significance, however, is essential to give 
meaning to statistical evidence.”) 
25 Id. 
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corrective disclosure.26  Commentators have argued that the same 
requirement should apply when event studies are used in the legal context,27 
and most courts have agreed.  As one court put it, “The case law establishes 
that 5% is the standard — though not exclusive — decision rule employed 
by courts . . . for identifying evidence of market efficiency or price impact 
in 10b-5 cases.”28   
We have written elsewhere about the challenges presented in adapting 
event study methodology for its use in securities fraud litigation, and we 
have identified several important methodological considerations and offered 
mechanisms for addressing them.29  In that prior work, we flagged but did 
not explore an additional concern, the widespread use of the 95% 
confidence level as the basis for accepting or rejecting the conclusions of an 
event study as probative on the question of whether a disclosure affected 
stock price.30   
Courts use the 95% confidence level in two ways.  First, they may 
determine that an event study that does not establish a relationship at the 
95% confidence level does not meet the requirements for admissibility 
under Daubert.31 Alternatively a court may conclude that the inability of an 
event study to meet the 95% threshold renders it legally insufficient as 
proof of the relationship between information and stock price for which it is 
offered.32 Thus, for example, the court in Halliburton III concluded that an 
event study showing a price movement that was statistically significant at a 
 
26 Not all courts correctly describe conventional hypothesis testing. For example, it is 
erroneous to say, as one court recently did, that “a statistically significant result … at a five 
percent level of significance … means that there is no more than a five percent chance that 
the observed relationship is purely random.” Carpenters Pension Trust Fund of St. Louis v. 
Barclays PLC, 310 F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Conventional hypothesis testing does not 
actually address the probability that an estimated statistical result is the product of chance. 
Rather, as the text above the line explains, it addresses the probability of observing results at 
least as extreme as the observed relationship given that only chance is at work. See Gelbach, 
Estimation Evidence, supra note 12 for more on this point. 
27 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller, Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, 
Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic 
v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1041 (1991) (“We suggest choosing a significance level 
such that the probability of a Type 1 error is less than 5%; this is a standard level used by 
researchers in finance and economics”). 
28 In re Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. Sec. Litig., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180895, *38-41 
29 Fisch, et al., supra note 7. 
30 Id. at 619. 
31 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993).  See, e.g., 
Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, No. 12-
1750, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 8994 (1st Cir. May 14, 2014), (rejecting event study for failure 
to meet the Daubert standards). 
32 On both this point and the one involving Daubert, see generally Gelbach, supra note 
12. 
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90% confidence level failed to demonstrate price impact because it was less 
than the 95% confidence level required.33 Similarly the court in In re Am. 
Int'l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., rejected plaintiff’s expert’s findings of price 
impact where the reported price declines were significant only at the 10% 
level.34  And in Intuitive Surgical the court found an absence of price 
impact where plaintiff’s expert provided event study results reporting price 
impact at a 90%, but not a 95% confidence level.35 
To be sure, not all courts view the 95% standard as critical.  As the court 
observed in Chi. Bridge, “it makes little sense to treat a finding just above 
the 5% level as nearly irrebuttable evidence that the disclosure impacted the 
stock price, while not considering a finding below the 5% level at all.”36  
Similarly, the Hatfield court recognized that, although “the 95% confidence 
interval is the threshold typically used by academic economists in their 
work” it was questionable “whether its use is appropriate in a forfeiture 
hearing, where the Government's burden is by a preponderance of the 
evidence”37  And the court in Pirnik reasoned that “a price impact 
statistically significant at a confidence level of only 92.12%, which is below 
the conventional statistical measure of a 95% confidence level [was] 
obviously less comfort than a result that is statistically significant at a 
confidence level of 95%, but it does not prove the absence of price 
impact.”38 
The reluctance to view the failure to meet the 95% confidence level as 
dispositive appears most frequently in analyses of market efficiency in 
which some courts have concluded that, while event studies may be useful 
in establishing market efficiency, they are not required.39  As a result, a 
 
33 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 270 (N.D. Tex. 2015) 
(finding no statistically significant price impact where plaintiffs’ expert found a statistically 
significant impact “only at a 90% confidence level, which is less than the 95% confidence 
level both experts require in their regression analyses and which the Court finds is 
necessary”). 
34 265 F.R.D. 157, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that expert findings of statistical 
significance at the 90% confidence level were not a sufficient basis upon which to find price 
impact). 
35 In re Intuitive Surgical Sec. Litig., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178148, *45 (N.D. Cal.) 
36 In re Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. Sec. Litig., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180895, *38-41 
37 United States v. Hatfield, 795 F. Supp. 2d 219, 234 (E.D. N.Y. 2011). 
38 Pirnik v. Fiat Chrysler Autos., N.V., 327 F.R.D. 38, 46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
39 See, e.g., City of Cape Coral Mun. Firefighters' Ret. Plan v. Emergent Biosolutions, 
Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d 676, 689 (D. Md. 2018) (concluding that plaintiffs established market 
efficiency even if the court were to ignore the expert’s empirical test because “Courts have 
routinely found a market efficient based on a showing that the first four Cammer factors only 
are met.”).  Courts most recently evaluate market efficiency on the basis of the five 
“Cammer” factors articulated in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).  See 
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court may consider an event study that establishes the responsiveness of 
market price to material disclosures at something less than a 95% 
confidence level as evidence in support of market efficiency.  Other courts, 
however, have held that proof of market efficiency requires that plaintiff 
provide both an event study and the other Cammer factors.40  Thus, in Ohio 
Pub., the court concluded that OPERS failed to establish market efficiency 
based on the “four structural Cammer factors” where “Correcting just some 
of the flaws in the [expert’s empirical analysis] leads to statistically 
insignificant results.”41 
In requiring a 95% confidence level, few courts have given any 
consideration to the potential tradeoff between confidence level and power.  
To our knowledge, only two published opinions in the securities litigation 
area even address the issue.  In Chi Bridge, the court recognized, in 
evaluating different event study methodologies, the potential tradeoff 
involved, noting that “by reducing the Type I error rate, multiple 
comparisons tend to increase the probability of Type II errors.”42  In In re 
Barclay’s Bank, plaintiffs challenged the defendant’s expert for failing to 
disclose the Type II error rate generated by his methodology.43  The court 
rejected this challenge, stating both that “Type II error rates appear to be 
irrelevant here” and that the failure to disclose such a rate did not render the 
methodology unreliable.44 
Finally, in demanding event studies that meet the 95% confidence level, 
some courts have failed to distinguish between the two distinct tasks for 
which event studies are introduced – demonstrating a relationship between 
information and stock price movement and establishing the absence of such 
a relationship.45  As a result, they have concluded that the inability of 
plaintiffs or their experts to produce an event study that shows a price 
movement at the 95% confidence level demonstrates the absence of price 
efficiency or the lack of price impact.46  But, as more recent decisions 
increasingly recognize, a failure to reject the null hypothesis is not the same 
 
also Carpenters Pension Trust Fund of St. Louis v. Barclays PLC, 310 F.R.D. 69, 84 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“courts have found market efficiency in the absence of an event study or 
where the event study was not definitive”). 
40 See, e.g., Ohio Pub. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 137229, *48 (holding that plaintiff failed to establish market efficiency based 
exclusively on deficiencies in the event study conducted by plaintiffs’ expert). 
41 Id. 
42 In re Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. Sec. Litig., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180895, *46 
43 In re Barclays Bank PLC Sec. Litig., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148695, *81-82 
44 Id. 
45 See, e.g. In re Am. Int'l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157, 186-187 (finding that 
defendants successfully rebutted the presumption of price impact by showing that price 
movements failed to meet the 95% threshold necessary for statistical significance). 
46 Id. 
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thing as proving that there was no price impact.47 Indeed, it is hornbook 
statistics that a failure to reject the null hypothesis does not imply that one 
accepts the negation of the null. 
 
B. Scholarly literature review 
 
As noted above, the event study methodology is drawn from financial 
economics.  Its origins are frequently attributed to a 1969 paper by Eugene 
Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael Jensen, and Richard Roll,48  Since that 
time, countless papers have refined the methodology for use in academic 
research.49  The use of event studies has expanded from finance research to 
legal academia.  Event studies are used to test for a variety of correlations, 
to make inferences about causation and to shed light on the impact of 
regulatory and policy decisions.50 Reliance on the 95% confidence level as 
a threshold for reporting results has an impressive pedigree,51 although 
journal articles frequently report results at other confidence levels with 
appropriate caveats about the significance to be attached to those results.52  
Although courts have generally accepted this literature in determining 
that judicial reliance on the 95% confidence level is appropriate, academic 
commentators have been more transparent in recognizing the policy 
 
47 We identified this issue in our prior work, and recent decisions increasingly recognize 
the difference.  See, e.g., Li v. Aeterna Zentaris, Inc., No. 14-CV-7081 (PGS) (TJB), 324 
F.R.D. 331, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33246, 2018 WL 1147082, at *10 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2018) 
(holding that the plaintiffs' expert's report "[did] not demonstrate the absence of a price 
impact," even though he failed to find price impact with 95% confidence); Di Donato v. Insys 
Therapeutics, Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160736, *40 (D. Ariz. 2019) (“The lack of 
statistically significant proof that a statement affected the stock price is not statistically 
significant proof of the opposite, i.e., that it did not actually affect the stock price.”).  See 
also Wilson v. LSB Indus., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138832, *37-38 (asserting that “courts 
routinely reject the argument that a non-statistically significant stock price decline proves an 
absence of price impact”). 
48 Eugene Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael Jensen & Richard Roll, The Adjustment of 
Stock Prices to New Information. 10 INT. ECON. REV. 1 (1969). 
49  See, e.g., John J. Binder, The Event Study Methodology Since 1969, 11 REV. 
QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 111, 120 (1998) (describing developments in the academic 
methodology). 
50 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I: 
Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141, 142 (2002) ("The event 
study methodology is well accepted and extensively used in finance [and Its use in policy 
analysis in recent years has become more widespread”). 
51 R.A. Fisher adopted the 95% threshold in his influential textbook. See R.A. FISHER, 
STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH WORKERS 45, 85 (5th ed. 1934). 
52 See Chi Bridge at *39 (observing that “while the author of a finance article may report 
findings at the 10% level, in addition to those at the 5% level, that is different than creating 
a decision rule for identifying evidence of market efficiency or price impact in 10b-5 cases”). 
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implications that follow from that choice.53  In an early article evaluating 
the use of event study methodology in securities fraud litigation, Macey, et 
al. recognized the tradeoff between power and confidence level but argued 
that courts should nonetheless apply the 95% confidence level because “this 
is a standard level used by researchers in finance and economics.”54 
Similarly, Fox, Fox and Gilson identified the tradeoff between Type I and 
Type II error55 and presented evidence that crisis-related spikes in 
idiosyncratic risk can magnify this tradeoff.56 
In one of the most extensive discussions of the issue, Alon Brav and 
J.B. Heaton documented the relationship between confidence level and 
power in securities fraud event studies and demonstrated the potential of 
this relationship to skew the results against finding evidence of price effect 
in cases in which the price movement in question is economically 
significant.57  To address this concern, they proposed that experts report the 
statistical power of their event studies, thereby enabling a court to 
incorporate the risk of Type II errors into its analysis of the event study’s 
reliability.58 Brav and Heaton did not explain, however, how courts should 
conduct this analysis.   
In a more recent article, Taylor Dove, Davidson Heath, and J.B. Heaton 
explore the relationship of low statistical power to confounding effects.59  
They show that, because judicial reliance on statistical significance 
truncates the sample of cases in which event studies demonstrate price 
impact, confounding effects have the potential to bias the size of the price 
impact that is demonstrated.  This has the result of increasing price impact 
and, potentially, damages.   
We continue, in this article, where Brav and Heaton left off in their 
 
53 Indeed, some academic commentators have gone further and argued that the courts 
place too much weight on the results of event studies in securities fraud litigation.  See 
Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role of 
Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation., 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 260 (2009) 
(arguing that the “event study requirement poses considerable Seventh Amendment concerns 
and is inconsistent with the federal securities laws.”). 
54 Macey, et al., supra note 27 at 1041. 
55 Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Economic Crisis and the 
Integration of Law and Finance: The Impact of Volatility Spikes, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 325, 
354 (citing example in which use of 95% confidence level results in a Type II error rate of 
83%). 
56 Id. at 357-58. 
57 Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation: Low Power, 
Confounding Effects, and Bias, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 583 (2015). 
58 Id. at 612-613.   
59 Dove et al., supra note 11 
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2015 article.60  We agree that the tradeoff between confidence level and 
power has the potential to bias the results of event studies, both in terms of 
the size of the observed effect and the weight that a court will give to it, but 
we argue that courts are poorly positioned, for several reasons, to evaluate 
expert data on confidence level and power and to determine how to navigate 
the tradeoff.  We further identify limitations on Congress’s ability to 
address the issue.  As a result, for the reasons we detail in Part III below, we 
believe that task should be performed by the SEC pursuant to formal notice-
and-comment rulemaking. 
II. CONFIDENCE LEVELS AND POWER: THE TRADEOFF 
 
The core idea of the efficient markets hypothesis is that publicly salient 
events that reduce investors’ perceptions of the value of a firm will lead 
some holders of the firm’s stock who think it is overpriced to sell. This 
dynamic will continue until the market price is in line with the “marginal” 
investor’s perception. A similar mechanism works in the opposite direction.  
Events that increase perceived value will cause investors to buy anew or 
increase their holdings of the firm’s stock until its price has risen enough to 
equilibrate the market. Event studies use statistical techniques to determine 
whether stock price changes are sufficiently large to suggest that an event of 
interest must have changed investors’ perceptions on the event date.  
We begin in section II.A with a brief discussion of the basic components 
of an event study. In section II.B, we then describe two types of potential 
errors. A Type I error occurs when the event study concludes that an event 
had a nonzero effect on stock price when in fact it had no effect. A Type II 
error involves a result indicating that an event had no effect when in fact it 
caused a price move. 
In section II.C, we discuss conventional hypothesis testing for statistical 
significance, which entails a careful explanation of confidence levels and 
the nearly equivalent concept of the significance level of statistical 
significance tests. These concepts relate to the probability of avoiding Type 
I errors, e.g., concluding that an alleged corrective disclosure reduced stock 
price when it really did not. 
In section II.D, we turn to the concept of power. In our context, power 
involves the probability of determining that an alleged corrective disclosure 
reduced firm price when the event really did affect price. In other words, 
power relates to the probability of avoiding a Type II error. 
 
60 Brav & Heaton, supra note 57. at 614 (“How that tradeoff should occur is beyond the 
scope of our Article, but addressing that important problem presents a challenge for future 
work.”). 
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In section II.E, we consider the implications of requiring a confidence 
level of 95%, which is what many experts/courts do. We show that with this 
confidence level, power can be very low for many firms. This means that in 
securities litigation involving these firms, there will be a high frequency of 
false negatives—finding there was no effect of an alleged corrective 
disclosure that really did reduce firm share price. 
In section II.F we investigate how power varies as we relax the 
confidence level. We show that there is a tradeoff between the two types of 
errors: Greater confidence levels generally come at the price of reduced 
power. This tradeoff is practically very relevant, because conventional 
hypothesis testing used by scholars, and thus by many experts in securities 
litigation, requires confidence levels high enough to yield very low power 
in many cases. For many firms involved in securities litigation, small 
reductions in these high confidence levels lead to comparatively large 
increases in power. 
 
 
A. Event Study Basics 
 
To conduct an event study, one first identifies the event of interest. In 
securities fraud litigation, that event is typically the public disclosure of 
material information.  One then defines a pre-event period of study. For the 
pre-event period, one estimates a regression model that relates the daily 
stock return to one or more variables representing the behavior of peer 
stocks, e.g., those of firms operating in similar industries. That requires data 
on daily returns for the stock of interest and for an index of peer stocks. The 
daily return for the stock of interest is the percentage change in the stock on 
a given date,61 with the daily return for an index of peer stocks computed in 
a way that accounts for differences in overall market valuation of the peer 
firms.62 With the data in hand, one then estimates the linear regression 
 
61 For example, if a stock’s price rises from $100 to $101 on date t, then its return for 
date t is 1%—100% times the ratio of a $1 increase in the stock price to the original value of 
$100; had the stock’s price instead fallen to $99, its daily return would have been -1%. 
Sometimes an author conducting an event study will use a different dependent variable, the 
log of (1+r), where r is the ratio of the change in the stock price from t-1 to t to the stock 
price at t-1 (in other words, r is the daily return measured in decimal rather than percentage 
turns). Results rarely depend importantly on which approach is used, so for simplicity we 
will stick to the percentage-change approach. 
62 The usual way to compute the index return is to base daily returns on a value-weighted 
index on each date. To calculate the value-weighted index amount on date t, one simply adds 
up the market capitalization of all firms in the index. Then one computes the percentage 
change in this overall market capitalization from date t-1 to date t. For example, if the firms 
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relationship between the daily returns of the stock of interest and the peer 
index.  
The resulting coefficient estimates are used with the event-date peer 
index return to estimate the expected return, that is, the daily return that 
would have been expected, on average, in the absence of the event of 
interest; call this estimate 𝑅 .63 We then compute the estimated abnormal 
return for the event date as the difference between the firm’s actual daily 
return and the expected one. In other words, the estimated abnormal return 
is found via the equation  
 
 AR = 𝑅 − 𝑅 . (1) 
 
The final step in an event study is to determine whether 𝐴𝑅 is so far 
from zero that one can confidently say that it would be too unusual to 
observe such a value if there were in fact no effect, a determination that is 
typically termed statistical significance. We take up that topic in section 
II.C; first, though, we discuss the conceptually prior concept of Type I and 
Type II errors. 
 
B.  Type I and Type II Errors in Event Studies 
 
To explain Type I and Type II errors, it helps to have a concrete type of 
event in mind. We’ll focus on a common type of event in securities 
litigation: plaintiffs’ allegation that a firm’s alleged corrective disclosure 
caused the firm’s stock price to fall. In this context, the event is the firm’s 
disclosure. A legally relevant “effect” means the disclosure caused firm 
price to fall, and “zero effect” means the disclosure did not affect firm 
price.64 
There are two potential types of correct decisions about the effects of 
the alleged corrective disclosure. First, in those situations in which the 
disclosure really did cause firm price to fall, it is correct to decide that it 
did. Second, in those situations in which the disclosure did not cause firm 
 
making up the index have overall market capitalization of $100 billion on date t-1 and $101 
billion on date t, then the return on the value-weighted index for date t would be 1%.  
For an algorithmic approach to choosing the industry index, see Andrew Baker & Jonah 
B. Gelbach, Machine Learning and Predicted Returns for Event Studies in Securities 
Litigation (typescript, on file with authors). 
63 Let Re be the event-date return for the firm of interest, let Rpeer be the daily return for 
the peer index, let a be the estimated intercept in the regression, and let b be the estimated 
coefficient on the industry peer index. Then the model-based estimated event-date return is 
𝑅 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 × 𝑅 . 
64 Analogous reasoning applies if the disclosure instead caused firm price to rise. 
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price to tall, it is correct to decide that it did not. Respectively, we will term 
these “correct positives” and “correct negatives”. 
There are also two potential types of errors. A false positive error 
involves deciding that an event had an effect when in fact it did not. 
Statisticians use the term “Type I” error to refer to false positive errors. So, 
when an alleged corrective disclosure had no effect on firm price, but 
experts/courts wrongly decide that it reduced firm price, they have 
committed a Type I error. 
 The second type of error is the false negative—deciding an event had 
no effect when in fact it had a nonzero effect. False negatives, also known 
as Type II errors, occur in our context when an alleged corrective disclosure 
actually reduced stock price, but experts/courts decide it did not. 
 
 
Table 1: Type I and Type II Errors in the Alleged Corrective Disclosure 
Context 
 Expert/Court Decision About Alleged Corrective 
Disclosure  
Truth About 
Disclosure It Had a Nonzero Effect It Had Zero Effect 
It Had Zero Effect False positive: Type I 
Error 
Correct negative 
It Had a Nonzero 
Effect 
Correct positive 
False negative: Type II 
Error 
 
Table 1 collects these four possible outcomes of a decisionmaking 
process—those involving correct positives and false positives (left column), 
and correct negatives and false negatives (right column). 
 
 
C.  Understanding Hypothesis Testing and the Confidence Level 
 
This section explains how conventional statistical significance testing 
works. Statistical significance testing is an instance of a broader class of 
methods known as hypothesis testing. A hypothesis is simply a state of the 
world. Experts using conventional hypothesis testing define two 
hypotheses—the “null hypothesis” and the “alternative hypothesis”—and 
use statistical methods to choose between them. 
In our example of considering whether an alleged corrective disclosure 
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reduced a firm’s stock price, the null hypothesis is the hypothesis that the 
disclosure had zero effect on firm price.65 The alternative hypothesis is that 
the disclosure reduced firm price. 
These hypotheses bear some additional explaining. If we want to know 
whether a firm’s price changed on a particular date, we can just compare its 
price on that date to its price on an earlier date. The challenge is that stock 
prices move all the time, for all kinds of reasons. As we discussed in section 
II.A, an event study tries to do more than determine whether a stock price 
changed at all; it tries to determine whether the price fell so much on an 
alleged corrective disclosure date so that we should believe something 
particularly important happened that day. An event study is meant to 
determine something about whether the observed drop in stock price is 
within the normal range for the stock in question, for a day when nothing 
unusual happened.66  All else equal, large price movements are more 
unusual and, therefore, more likely to have been caused by the alleged 
corrective disclosure. But what does “large” mean?  
Statistical significance tests answer this question, in the securities 
litigation context, by defining a threshold level of price drop such that any 
price drop smaller than the threshold is considered to be within the usual 
range of chance variations in stock price, as measured by the abnormal 
return.67 The usual range is defined to include all but those values of the 
abnormal return that would be observed on most dates when nothing 
unusual happened—in other words, all typical dates except those on which 
the most extreme circumstances occurred. The threshold for a price 
movement that is extreme enough is known as the “significance level” and 
is often referred to using the Greek letter α. Many experts use a significance 
level of α=5%, so that the usual range of abnormal returns includes all but 
 
65 The defendant’s case generally would be made not only when the alleged corrective 
disclosure has zero effect, but also—a fortiori—if the alleged corrective disclosure caused 
firm price to rise. We work with the narrow version of the null hypothesis for expositional 
reasons.  
66 This means an event study tells us something about how likely the observed data (“D”) 
would be if the null hypothesis (“NH”) were true. Courts sometimes misunderstand this and 
think event studies (and null hypothesis testing in general) tells us about the probability that 
the null hypothesis is true, given the observed data. In other words, conventional event 
studies tell us something about the probability of observing D, given NH, whereas the legal 
question is usually thought of as the probability that NH is true, given D.   
These are not generally the same thing; for a discussion, see, e.g., Gelbach, supra note 
12. For an approach to event studies that uses Bayes’s theorem to learn about the probability 
of the null hypothesis given the data, see Gelbach & Hawkins, supra note 7. 
67 See section II.A for the definition of abnormal return; for our purposes this is simply 
the measure of stock price change. 
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the 5% most extreme negative values.68  
To illustrate, suppose the firm being sued has daily abnormal returns 
that follow the normal distribution with mean 0.69 The normal distribution is 
convenient because its volatility is entirely characterized by its standard 
deviation, which is typically denoted with the Greek letter σ.70  
To provide some perspective on the range of stocks’ standard deviations, 
we obtained securities price return data for calendar year 2015 from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (“CRSP”) daily stock returns file.71 
We estimated a simple market model for each security, using the CRSP 
value-weighted index of all securities as the market index.72 We then 
calculated daily abnormal returns for each security, and finally we calculated 
the standard deviation of these daily abnormal returns. Table 2 reports salient 
percentiles of the distribution of firm-level daily-return standard deviations. 
The median value of σ across firms was 1.6%. More than half of the securities 
we considered had a daily abnormal return standard deviation above σ=1.6%. 
Fewer than 1 in 10 securities in our data had a σ value as low as 0.5%, and 
the same share had a σ value greater than 4.5%.73 A quarter had σ<0.9%, and 
a quarter had σ>2.8%.  
 
Table 2: Percentiles of the Firm-Level Daily Standard Deviation of 
 
68 Experts do not necessarily use the exact wording we use here; we are using simplifying 
language to explain the ideas at play. 
69 Normality of daily abnormal returns may be rejected for many firms’ stocks; see Jonah 
B. Gelbach, Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Valid Inference in Single-Firm, Single-Event 
Studies, 15 AM. LAW ECON. REV. 495 (2013) and sources cited therein for discussion. We 
assume normality in this part of the paper for expositional purposes. We can use ideas related 
to the SQ test proposed in Gelbach, Helland, & Klick to account for any non-normality in a 
firm’s stock returns. Because doing so requires added notation and complexity, we confine 
the analysis to Part IV.C. 
70 The standard deviation of a random variable’s distribution is the expected value, or 
mean, of the squared deviation from the random variable’s mean. If X is the variable, and µ 
is its mean, then the standard deviation is 𝜎 = 𝐸[(𝑋 − µ) ]. For random variables with a 
normal distribution, the entire distribution is fully characterized by the mean and standard 
deviation. 
71 We obtained these data via download from the Wharton Research Data Services 
website, https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/crsp/stock_a/dsf.cfm?navId=128. We 
included data on all equity securities included in the CRSP data base, except that we used 
data for only those securities for which data were available on 200 or more days during 2015. 
There were 6,820 such securities. 
72 We offer the results in Table 2 in an illustrative spirit only, but in practice, the firm-
level abnormal return is better estimated with the inclusion of an industry-based peer index 
regressor. See Baker & Gelbach, supra note 62 for discussion.  
73 In other words, the 10th and 90th percentiles were 0.5% and 4.5%, respectively. 
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Abnormal Returns 
Percentile 
Firm-Level 
Standard Deviation (σ) 
10 0.5% 
25 0.9% 
50 1.6% 
75 2.8% 
90 4.5% 
 
Throughout the balance of this Article, we will use a standard deviation 
level of σ=1% as our benchmark for a relatively low-volatility firm.74 We 
will use a standard deviation of σ=3% as the corresponding benchmark for a 
relatively high-volatility firm.75 We use σ=0.5% and σ=4.5% as measures of 
the standard deviation for firms with especially low and especially high 
volatility, as these are the 10th and 90th percentiles, as reported in Table 2. 
In our subsequent discussion, it will be convenient to use the term 
“stock price drop” in place of “abnormal return”.76 Although we employ 
these terms interchangeably throughout the following discussion, but it 
should be understood that the term stock price, as used here, is computed 
after adjusting for other variables included in the stock return model. 
Given that abnormal returns are normally distributed, it can be shown 
that the threshold for a test with 95% confidence level always equals 
roughly 1.64 times the standard deviation.77 This means that for our low-
volatility firm, with σ=1%, if nothing special happened on a date of interest, 
the appropriate threshold for a 5% significance level—and thus a 95% 
confidence level—is 1.64%. That is, the low-volatility firm will exhibit a 
stock price drop of at least 1.64% roughly 5% of the time, when there is no 
event-driven price impact on the date in question. Experts using 
conventional hypothesis testing would therefore consider a negative 
abnormal return of magnitude, say, 1.7% large enough to reject the null 
hypothesis of no price effect for the low-volatility firm, but not one of 
magnitude, say, 1.2%.  
 
74 This is the 27th percentile value of firm-level σ in our data. 
75 This is the 77th percentile value of firms-level σ in our data. 
76 This will allow us to avoid repeatedly emphasizing that the estimated abnormal return 
must be negative to reject the null hypothesis. 
77 This number results from solving the equation 𝑃(𝑍 ≤ 𝑧 ) = 𝐶𝐿 for the variable 𝑧 , 
where 𝑍 is a random variable with a normal distribution having mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. The object 𝑧  is known as “the CL-quantile”, and for the standard normal 
distribution with CL=0.95 (i.e., 95% expressed in decimal form), we have 𝑧 = Φ (0.95), 
which equals 1.64 to two decimal places. 
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For our high-volatility firm, the one with σ=3%, the threshold is 1.64 
times σ=3%, which results in 4.92%.78 Thus for the high-volatility firm, an 
estimated stock price drop of 5% would be enough to reject the null 
hypothesis, but one of 4.8% would not. Intuitively, for a more volatile 
stock, a wider range of price drops is within the range of observation on 
typical days. For a firm with greater standard deviation, σ, a more 
substantial price drop must be observed before an expert can reject the null 
hypothesis at a given confidence level. 
This discussion indicates there are two key variables relevant to the 
threshold for significance testing.  The first is the volatility of the firm’s 
daily stock price, as measured by the standard deviation, which is often 
referred to using the Greek letter σ. The second variable is the significance 
level α.  
In the foregoing discussion, we have used the terms significance level 
and confidence level.  The significance level is the likelihood that we will 
reject the null hypothesis when it is false—meaning, that we will incorrectly 
find a price effect.79 The lower the value of the significance level α, the 
larger the price drop on the event date will have to be to reject the null 
hypothesis.  
An equivalent way to describe the concepts underlying the significance 
level is the confidence level, which henceforth we denote CL. To 
understand confidence levels, observe that the following are equivalent 
statements:  
 
(i) an abnormal return is not among the 5% most extreme 
negative values for typical dates, and  
 
(ii) an abnormal return is among the 95% values that are not the 
most extreme negative values.  
 
For example, we’ve seen that for a low-volatility firm, with σ=1%, a 
price drop of greater than 1.64% is among the 5% most extreme 
observations on a typical date. This means that a price drop of less than 
1.64% (say, a drop of 1.2%, or a price increase of 0.4%) would be among 
the other 95% of observations, the range that we considered, within this 
context, typical price fluctuations. A 95% confidence level means that, if 
the event didn’t cause our price to drop, the observed price change will lie 
outside the 5% most extreme price drops with probability 95%.   
The confidence level and the significance level play mirror-image roles 
 
78 The exact number is closer to 4.93%; the difference is inconsequential and due to 
rounding. 
79 That is, the threshold 𝑧  is chosen to ensure this result. 
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in separating the sets of observed price changes into those that do not make 
us reject the null hypothesis and those that do.  Thus it is equivalent to say 
that an expert uses a significance level of α=5% and that the expert uses a 
confidence level of CL=95%. Similarly, an expert using a significance level 
of α=10% has confidence level of CL=90%, and so on.80 All else equal, a 
higher confidence level requires a larger event-date price drop to determine 
there was a statistically significant drop in firm price on that date, and a 
lower confidence level requires a smaller price drop. 
In the foregoing discussion, a price drop of 1.64% reflects the threshold 
value above which a price drop is considered most extreme.  We use the 
term 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝜎, 𝐶𝐿) to emphasize that the threshold’s value depends on 
both volatility, σ  ̧and the confidence level, CL.81 As we touched on above, 
the threshold value equals the product of the standard deviation σ and an 
appropriate percentile of the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard 
deviation equal to 1.82 
Table 3 provides four examples of the threshold values used to 
implement conventional statistical significance testing. The rows of the 
table list two confidence levels commonly used—95% and 90%. The 
columns provide values of the standard deviation for a low-volatility firm 
(σ=1%) and a high-volatility firm (σ=3%).  
  
 
80 In precise terms, CL = 100% - α. 
81 For a firm whose abnormal returns are not normally distributed, the threshold will 
depend on the shape of the abnormal returns distribution in a way that cannot generally be 
summarized with just the standard deviation, σ. See Part IV.C for our discussion of this more 
general case. 
82 The equation is 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝜎, 𝐶𝐿) = σ × z , where 𝑧  is the CL-percentile of the 
standard normal distribution. This threshold reflects the fact that under the null hypothesis 
that nothing unusual happened on the event date, the event-date abnormal return has a normal 
distribution with mean 0% and standard deviation σ. It is a fact about the normal distribution 
that if X has a normal distribution with standard deviation σ, its percentiles equal σ times the 
corresponding percentiles of the standard normal distribution. Thus, the CL-percentile of the 
distribution of X equals 𝜎𝑧  for any choice of CL. It is straightforward to show that a 
statistician doing null hypothesis testing using the threshold level 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝜎, 𝐶𝐿) will 
fail to reject the null hypothesis CL percent of the time; equivalently, the statistician  will 
reject the null hypothesis 100%-CL=α percent of the time.  
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Table 3: Examples of 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝜎, 𝐶𝐿) for Rejecting Null Hypothesis 
 Volatility level 
Confidence level: Low: σ=1% High: σ=3% 
 
CL=95% 
 
 
1.64% 
 
 
4.92% 
 
 
CL=90% 
 
 
1.28% 
 
3.84% 
 
Each cell reports the minimum value of the drop in firm price, measured by the event-
date abnormal return, necessary to reject the null hypothesis that the alleged corrective 
disclosure had no impact on the event date. 
 
 
The table shows that when the confidence level is 95%, an expert would 
reject the null hypothesis if the low-volatility firm had a price drop of more 
than 1.64%, but will reject the null hypothesis for a high-volatility firm 
whose price dropped more than 4.92%. Experts requiring the lower 
confidence level of 90% would reject the null hypothesis whenever there 
was an event date price drop of more than 1.28% for the low-volatility firm 
and 3.84% for the high-volatility firm. These figures show that the threshold 
for rejecting the null hypothesis is sensitive to both the volatility of the 
firm’s share price and the confidence level the expert uses. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the relationship between the null hypothesis, the 
significance level, and the confidence level.  
 
 
Table 4: Concepts Related to 
Conventional Statistical Significance Testing 
Concept Explanation 
Null hypothesis  The hypothesis that the event had no effect 
on the firm’s stock price. 
Significance level: α Chance of a false negative—a Type I—error 
when the null hypothesis is true. 
Confidence level: CL=1-α  Chance of a correct negative result when the 
null hypothesis is true. 
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The foregoing discussion summarizes at a high level the key 
methodology used in conventional statistical significance testing.83 This 
discussion paints only half the picture. We turn now to power, which is the 
other half of the story. 
 
D.  Understanding Power  
 
We saw in the previous section that the threshold used for statistical 
significance testing is based on assuming the null hypothesis is true. That 
means the test’s performance is geared to characteristics of decisionmaking 
when the null hypothesis is true—namely the probability of making either 
the false negative (Type I) error or the correct negative decision. But it also 
means that conventional hypothesis testing is not at all based on the 
probability of correct or erroneous decisions given that the null hypothesis 
is false. As a result, it is natural to wonder how conventional statistical 
significance testing performs when the alternative hypothesis, rather than 
the null hypothesis, is true.  
The probability of a false negative/Type II error is often denoted with 
the Greek letter β. Power is the probability of correctly rejecting an actually 
false null hypothesis and is often denoted with the Greek letter π. Because 
the probability of a false negative and the probability of a correct positive 
must add up to 1, we have 𝜋 = 100% − 𝛽.84 
The greater the power of a test, the higher the chance that the test will 
detect a real effect.  Just as higher confidence is a good thing, so, too, is 
greater power. Table 5 summarizes the relationship between types of errors, 
types of correct decisions, significance level, confidence levels, and 
power.85 
  
 
83 We have deliberately abstracted from the details of how the standard deviation and 
the event-date abnormal return is estimated, as well as from various other nuts-and-bolts 
issues such as non-normality of abnormal returns. These issues are discussed in detail in our 
other work; see FGK (Texas 2018).  
84 This follows because when the alternative hypothesis is true, the only two possible 
statistician decisions are (i) to reject the null hypothesis, which is a correct positive, or (ii) to 
fail to reject the null hypothesis, which is a false negative. 
85 This table differs from Table 1 only in that we’ve added nomenclature. 
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Table 5: Concepts Related to the Truth Value of Null Hypothesis and 
Hypothesis Test Outcomes 
 Statistician’s Decision  
State of 
World: 
 
Reject Null 
 
Don’t Reject Null 
 
Relationship  
Null is 
true Type I error  
(false positive) 
 
Test threshold is 
set so that this 
equals the 
significance level, 
α 
Correct negative  
 
 
Test threshold is 
set so that 
probability this 
happens is 
confidence level, 
CL 
 
𝐶𝐿 = 100% − 𝛼 
Null is 
false Correct positive 
 
 
Probability it 
happens is power, 
π 
Type II error 
(false negative) 
 
Probability it 
happens is 𝛽 
 
 
 
𝛽 = 100% − 𝜋 
 
Power varies with the magnitude of the actual share price movement.  
To analyze a test’s power, we must therefore specify this magnitude, which 
we will represent with the Greek letter γ. If the alleged corrective disclosure 
caused share price to fall by one percent, then γ=1%. 
Suppose for the moment that we are somehow able to know that a 
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corrective disclosure actually caused share price to fall by γ=3%. For a low-
volatility firm (σ=1%), this is a large effect—3 times its daily standard 
deviation. As in the previous section, the threshold, using the 95% 
confidence level, to reject the null hypothesis is a price drop of 1.64%. The 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis is thus the probability that the 
event date estimated abnormal return will reflect a price drop of more than 
1.645%, given that the event actually did cause a price drop of γ=3%. In 
our example, the chances of this happening are 91%.86  
Table 6 provides the values, for this example, of each of the conceptual 
variables in Table 5. The top row shows that the test has a confidence level 
of CL=95% (corresponding to a Type I error rate of α=5%) when the null 
hypothesis is true. This fact is true by construction: i.e., we chose the 
threshold price drop of 1.64% to make sure it would hold, as discussed in 
section II.C. The bottom row of the table shows what we determined in the 
previous paragraph: When the event in question actually caused price to 
drop γ=3%, a test with a confidence level of CL=95% correctly rejects the 
null hypothesis about π=91% of the time; the other β=9% of the time, this 
test commits the Type II error of failing to reject a false null hypothesis. 
This example shows that the 95% confidence level coexists with high power 
for our low-volatility firm (σ=1%) when there’s a large price effect 
(γ=3%).87  
 
Table 6: Power and Error Rate for Low-Volatility Firm with 3% Price 
Drop at 5% Significance Level 
 Reject null Don’t reject null 
Null is 
true 
Type I error rate is α=5% 
(significance level) 
Probability of correct decision is 
CL=95% 
(confidence level) 
Null is 
false 
Power—probability of correct 
decision—is π=91% 
Type II error rate is β=9% 
 
 
86 The probability in question may be found by letting X be a normally distributed 
random variable with mean -3 and standard deviation 1. The probability in question is the 
probability that X will take on a value less than -1.64: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑋 < −1.645) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑋 − (−3) < −1.645 − (−3)) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑍 < 1.355), 
where 𝑍 is a standard normal random variable. This probability is approximately 0.91, or 
91%. 
87 Equivalently, both types of error are relatively unlikely for such a firm when the 
alleged corrective disclosure really caused a 3% share price drop. 
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Now consider the high-volatility firm, the one with standard deviation 
σ=3%. For this firm, price drops of γ=3% happen with reasonably high 
frequency. Thus it will be relatively unlikely for the abnormal return to 
show a large enough price drop that an expert using statistical significance 
testing will reject the null hypothesis. The expert will reject the null 
hypothesis under these circumstances only about π=26% of the time.88 
Thus, when the firm has standard deviation σ=3% and the expert uses the 
confidence level CL=95%, if the true effect is γ=3%, the expert will commit 
a Type II error β=74% of the time. 
 
 
Table 7: Power and Error Rate for High-Volatility Firm with 3% Price 
Drop at 5% Significance Level 
 
 Reject null Don’t reject null 
Null is 
true 
Type I error rate is α=5% 
(significance level) 
Probability of correct 
decision is CL=95% 
(confidence level) 
Null is 
false 
Power—probability of correct decision—
is π=26% 
Type II error rate is 
β=74% 
 
One way to think of these results is that (1) the statistical cost of 
insisting on a 95% confidence level varies with the volatility of the firm’s 
daily abnormal return, and (2) this cost can be substantial, especially for 
high-volatility firms. An expert using a test with confidence level 95% for a 
high-volatility firm (σ=3%) would find no actionable price drop in roughly 
three of four cases in which there was a price drop of γ=3%. For a firm with 
market capitalization of $4 billion, a fraud of that magnitude represents 
$120 million (3% of $4 billion). That’s a substantial amount. 
There is a general formula that relates power (π), the confidence level 
(CL), volatility (σ), and the true effect magnitude (γ). It can be shown that 
higher power is associated with a lower confidence level, with a lower level 
 
88 The probability that a normally distributed random variable X having mean -3 and 
standard deviation σ=3 will take on a value less than −1.645 × 𝜎 = 4.935 is: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑋 < −4.935) = 𝑃𝑟
( )
<
. ( )
= 𝑃𝑟(𝑍 < −0.645. ), 
where 𝑍 is a standard normal random variable. This probability is approximately 0.26, or 
26%. 
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of volatility, and with a higher true event effect.89  
We now turn to a systematic discussion of the tradeoff between 
confidence level and power highlighted by the foregoing discussion. 
 
E.  The Power Implications of Requiring a 95% Confidence Level  
 
To understand the power implications of the 95% confidence level in 
more general terms, it will help to express abnormal returns as multiples of 
the standard deviation. This approach helps put stocks whose abnormal 
returns are naturally more variable on a similar playing field. Recall that a 
stock with abnormal return standard deviation of σ=3% is more volatile 
than one with a standard deviation of σ=1%, so that it is much more likely 
that the high-volatility firm will see a sizable price drop even in the absence 
of an important event.90 Failing to account for that fact would confuse 
issues as we consider the tradeoff between confidence level and power.  
For this reason, it can be useful to express daily abnormal returns in 
multiples of the firm’s σ. For a firm with standard deviation σ=3%, a daily 
abnormal return of γ=3% amounts to a one-σ price drop. Our Table 7 
example involved an event that caused a one-σ price drop, showing that 
when daily abnormal returns are normally distributed, we will reject the null 
hypothesis only π=26% of the time when the event actually caused a one-σ 
price drop. This is equally the case any time a firm’s standard deviation 
equals the price drop effect, i.e., whenever σ=γ. Thus, power is π=26% not 
 
89 When abnormal returns have a normal probability distribution, this formula is: 
 
𝜋 = Φ 𝑧 + , 
 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, 𝑧  is the 
𝑝th quantile of this distribution (for example, with p=0, 𝑧 = 0, which is another way of 
saying the median of the standard normal distribution is 0). Because both the cumulative 
distribution function and the quantile function are strictly increasing for a continuous random 
variable, the partial derivatives of power with respect to CL, γ, and 𝜎 are negative, positive, 
and negative, which implies that power is negatively associated with the confidence level 
and volatility, but positively associated with event effect magnitude. Finally, we note that 
the formula above may be re-written in terms of Type I and Type II error rates by substituting 
β=1-π and α=1-CL. Thus when the Type I error rate is α, the Type II error rate is given by 
the equation 𝛽 = 1 − Φ 𝑧 + . The same reasoning above indicates that the two types of 
error rates are negatively associated—which is another way of saying there’s a tradeoff 
between them—and that the Type II error rate is possibility associated with volatility (σ) and 
negatively associated with true event effect magnitude (γ). 
90 For the same reason, the firm with σ=3% is also more likely to see larger price 
increases than is the firm with σ=1%, even in the absence of events that would tend to cause 
price to rise. 
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only for our Table 7 example with σ=γ=3%, but also for the combination of 
a low-volatility firm with a small true price drop, i.e., σ=γ=1%, as well as 
for a very high-volatility firm with a very high price drop, i.e., σ=γ=5%.  
Further, there’s nothing special about the one-σ aspect of these 
examples. If the ratio of σ to γ is the same, then the power of the test will be 
the same.91 Consider again the low-volatility firm, with σ=1%, but now 
consider an event that causes a γ=3% price drop. That is exactly the 
example we considered in Table 6, where we saw that power was π=91%. 
Thus, any time the true price effect caused by an event is 3 times the stock 
return’s standard deviation—so that γ=3σ—power will be π=91% when the 
confidence level is CL=95%. 
We can determine test power for other values of price effect and 
volatility besides those for which γ=σ or γ=3σ. Table 8 does this, showing 
how power, π, varies with the ratio of event effect size, γ, to volatility, σ, 
given that we continue to require a CL=95% confidence level. The 
examples just discussed, from the two preceding tables, correspond to the 
rows of Table 8 for which the value in the first column is 1.00-σ (Table 7) 
and 3.00-σ (Table 6).  
  
 
91 This invariance can be shown to be a property of the normal distribution, whose shape 
is entirely governed by the standard deviation parameter. That means changes in the scale of 
the distribution—how dispersed daily abnormal returns will typically be—are fully captured 
by changes in the standard deviation parameter. Accordingly, as long as we are willing to 
maintain the assumption of normality, we lose nothing by focusing only on the event effect’s 
magnitude in standard deviation multiples. 
13-Apr-20] REFORM EVENT STUDY SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS 29 
 
 
Table 8: How Power Varies with Actual Event Effect Size 
(effect size is measured in units of standard deviation) 
True event 
effect size, γ, 
measured in 
multiples of σ 
 Power: π 
(Probability of  
Rejecting Null 
When CL=95%) 
0.00*  5%* 
0.25  8% 
0.50  13% 
0.75  19% 
1.00**  26%** 
1.25  35% 
1.50  44% 
1.64  50% 
1.75  54% 
2.00  64% 
2.25  73% 
2.50  80% 
2.75  87% 
3.00***  91%*** 
3.25  95% 
3.50  97% 
    * The null hypothesis is true when the event effect is 
0. 
  ** Table 6 example. 
*** Table 7 example. 
 
 
Additionally, Table 7 shows that the test’s power is very low when the 
effect size is less than 1 unit of standard deviation. Power meets or exceeds 
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50% whenever the true effect size γ is at least 1.64 multiples of σ, and it is 
80% or greater whenever the true effect size γ exceeds 2.50 multiples of σ. 
The overall lesson that results from Table 8 is simple: the greater is the true 
effect size, γ, relative to abnormal return volatility, σ, the greater will be the 
test power for a given confidence level. Thus, holding the confidence level 
constant, greater effect size and greater power go hand in hand. 
Our power discussion so far has effectively held constant the volatility 
of firms’ daily abnormal returns. To understand how volatility itself 
matters, it is necessary to ask what magnitude of true effect is necessary to 
have a particular degree of power.  We illustrate the answer to this question 
by comparing the required event effect magnitude for low- and high-
volatility firms. Once again we use a firm with a standard deviation of daily 
abnormal returns of σ=1% as our low-volatility example, and one with a 
standard deviation of σ=3% as a high-volatility firm. 
The first column of Table 8 shows various levels of power that one 
might demand. The table’s second column provides the required true event 
effect magnitude necessary to achieve the power listed in the first column, 
for our low-volatility firm (the one that has σ=1%).92 The third column 
shows the corresponding required event effect magnitude necessary for our 
high-volatility firm (the one with σ=3%). To achieve an even chance—
50%—of rejecting a false null hypothesis requires a γ=1.64% price drop 
with the low-volatility firm. By contrast, the test achieves power of 50% 
with the high-volatility firm only if the true event effect corresponds to a 
price drop of γ=4.92%. To obtain power of 80%, a level often sought in 
applied statistics,93 we need the true event effect to be γ=2.49% for the low-
volatility firm and γ=7.46% for the high-volatility firm.94 
  
 
92 By design, the first two columns of Table 9 are just the two columns of Table 8, but 
in reverse order. 
93 See JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 
(2d ed. 1988). 
94 Careful readers will note that the numbers in the third column all equal 3 times those 
in the first column. That occurs because the impact of increasing volatility by a factor of 3—
moving from a firm with σ=1% to one with σ=3%—is exactly offset by tripling the event 
effect size, γ, and vice-versa. With normally distributed price effects, this relationship holds 
generally, i.e., not just with a factor of 3. Thus, as we scale up the volatility, we also scale 
up the event effect size, γ, required to achieve any given desired power, π. 
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Table 9: Required Effect Size to Achieve Desired Power When 
CL=95% 
  Event Effect Magnitude Needed to Achieve Desired Power, π 
Power, π 
(Probability of 
rejecting the 
null) 
 Low-Volatility Firm: σ=1%  High-Volatility Firm: 
σ=1% 
8%  0.24% 
 
0.72% 
13%  0.52% 
 
1.56% 
19%  0.77% 
 
2.30% 
26%  1.00% 
 
3.00% 
35%  1.26% 
 
3.78% 
44%  1.49% 
 
4.48% 
50%  1.64% 
 
4.93% 
54%  1.75% 
 
5.24% 
64%  2.00% 
 
6.01% 
73%  2.26% 
 
6.77% 
80%  2.49% 
 
7.46% 
87%  2.77% 
 
8.31% 
91%  2.99% 
 
8.96% 
95%  3.29% 
 
9.87% 
97%  3.53% 
 
10.58% 
*The null hypothesis is true when the event effect is 0. 
 
 
It is clear, then, for firms with greater price volatility, a given level of 
power may require a considerably higher true event effect size. For a high-
volatility firm with market capitalization of $4 billion, power of 80% exists 
only for frauds that inflated firm value by over $300 million. To get power 
on par with the confidence level of 95% for a high-volatility firm would 
require that the corrective disclosure caused a price drop of almost 10%, 
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indicating that the fraud inflated firm value by nearly $400 million. 
 Figure 1 plots the required effect size and power for firms with the 
volatility levels we’ve discussed, i.e., σ=1% (thick solid line) and σ=3% 
(thick, dashed line). It also adds the extreme low volatility and extreme high 
volatility levels of σ=0.5% and σ=4.5%.95  
  
Figure 1: How the Power-Effect Size Relationship Varies 
with Standard Deviation 
(test with 95% confidence level) 
 
 
The figure’s horizontal axis lists various potential values of the true 
effect size of a corrective disclosure, ranging from 0 percent to 10 percent 
of firm value. The vertical axis shows the power of a test with a confidence 
level of CL=95%. Thus for the σ=1% and 3% cases, the figure is essentially 
a graphical version of the information in Table 9.  
Now consider the top curve, which is for a firm with very low volatility, 
σ=0.5% (the 10th percentile of the firm-level distribution of σ in our CRSP 
data for 2015). For such a firm, test power, π, tops 50%—so that the test 
nearly always correctly rejects the null hypothesis when there really is an 
event effect; this is true even when a corrective disclosure reduces firm 
value by only γ=1% (that’s not enough even to obtain power of  π=10% for 
our σ=3% firm). For a firm with σ=0.5% and an event effect size of only 
 
95 Recall from the discussion of Table 2 above that these are the 10th and 90th percentiles 
of the firm-level distribution of σ values. 
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γ=2%, power reaches nearly π=100%; thus a correct determination that 
there was an event effect is virtually certain for such a firm even with an 
event effect that’s quite small in absolute terms.96 
At the other end of the extreme is the bottom curve, which is for a firm 
with standard deviation of abnormal returns equal to σ=4.5% (the 90th 
percentile of the firm-level distribution of σ in our CRSP data for 2015). A 
test with confidence level CL=95% is very unlikely to reject the null 
hypothesis for this firm even when a corrective disclosure has quite a 
substantial effect on stock price. Even a γ=5% effect of the corrective 
disclosure on such a firm’s value is only a touch more than a one-σ effect, 
so it brings only about a π=30% chance of correctly rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no event effect. 
Two take home points from Figure 1 are straightforward. First, if the 
firm in question has low volatility of daily abnormal returns, then only 
relatively small effects are needed to have reasonably high power, i.e., to 
identify an effect that really occurred. But second, for highly volatile firms, 
power is quite low even for substantively sizable event effects. This is true 
because it just wouldn’t be very surprising to see a 5% daily stock price 
move for a firm with σ=4.5%, even on a day when nothing especially 
unusual happened for that firm. Thus, Figure 1 illustrates the fact that power 
depends importantly on both the true effect of the event of interest and the 
volatility of a firm’s daily abnormal returns. 
To put all this in perspective, it is helpful to recall from our discussion 
above that the meat of the firm-level distribution of σ values in our 2015 
data lies between σ=1% and σ=3%. This means that for many firms, power 
will be relatively low for event effect sizes between γ=2% and γ=6%. 
Additional perspective follows from observing that Halliburton had a 
standard deviation of about 1.7% during the period considered by experts 
who wrote reports in the Halliburton litigation,97 putting Halliburton close 
to the middle of our examples of low- and high-volatility firms.  
 
F.  The Tradeoff Between the Confidence Level and Power 
 
As noted above, the social science literature commonly uses a 95% 
confidence level. Our analysis demonstrates the power implications of 
insisting on that particular confidence level. We have seen that for a large 
majority of firms, requiring this very demanding confidence level results in 
 
96 Note that an event effect of 1% is a 2-σ effect for a firm with volatility σ=0.5%; this 
explains the results just described. 
97 See Fisch, et al., supra note 7. 
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a test that has quite low power, except when event effects are very large. In 
other words, except for high-value frauds, it is very unlikely that an expert 
witness will reject the null hypothesis and find that the event had a 
sufficient effect on the stock price even when the fraud is real. In this 
section we explain how this problem can be addressed by reducing the 
required confidence level. 
Suppose we substitute a 75% confidence level for the required 95% 
confidence level. How would that change affect the required magnitude of 
the stock price drop? Consider first our low-volatility firm, the one with 
σ=1%. For that firm, rejecting the null hypothesis at the 75% confidence 
level requires a stock price drop of roughly 0.67%, or larger.98 This is 
considerably less than the price drop of 1.64% we require to reject the null 
hypothesis when we use a confidence level of 95%. Table 10 repeats the 
format of Table 8, but with an additional column added to show the power 
associated with various actual event effect magnitudes when we set the 
confidence level to CL=75%.  
  
 
98 With the threshold for rejection set at -0.67%, the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis when it is true is Pr(𝑍 < −0.67) = Φ(−0.67) = 0.25, where Z is once again a 
standard normal random variable. Since the probability of rejecting the true null hypothesis, 
or size, is 0.25, the confidence level is 1 − 0.25 = 0.75, or 75%. 
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Table 10: How Power Varies with the Confidence Level 
for a Low-Volatility Firm 
(σ=1%, Significance threshold = -1.64%) 
True Effect, γ  
(in percentage points) 
 Confidence Level 
 95% 75% 
0.25  8% 34% 
0.5  13% 43% 
0.75  19% 53% 
1  26% 63% 
1.25  35% 72% 
1.5  44% 80% 
1.65  50% 84% 
1.75  54% 86% 
2  64% 91% 
2.25  73% 94% 
2.5  80% 97% 
2.75  87% 98% 
3  91% 99% 
3.25  95% 99% 
3.5  97% 100% 
3.75  98% 100% 
4  99% 100% 
4.25  100% 100% 
4.5  100% 100% 
4.75  100% 100% 
 
 
Comparing the second and third columns of Table 10 shows that for 
relatively small event effect magnitudes, power is much greater when we 
reduce the confidence level from CL=95% to CL=75%. For example, the 
table shows that even for a corrective disclosure that reduces firm value by 
only 0.25%, power is 34 percent—substantially above the 8% power 
obtained when the confidence level is CL=95%. To obtain power above 50 
percent—so that we have a better-than-even chance of detecting a real event 
effect—it is enough for the event effect to cause a price drop of only 
γ=0.75%. And for an event that causes price to drop by γ=1.64%—the 
estimated daily abnormal return required to reject the null hypothesis of no 
event effect when we insist on confidence 95 percent—power is 84 percent. 
With a confidence level of CL=95%, power that great would require that the 
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event actually caused stock price to drop at least γ=2.5%. 
The same pattern holds when we consider a high-volatility firm, one 
with σ=3%. Table 11 reports the power level for confidence levels CL=95% 
and CL=75% for such a firm. It shows that reducing the required confidence 
level from 95% to 75%, increases power from π=6% to π=28% when the 
event causes a drop in stock price of γ=0.25%. With a confidence level of 
CL=75%, power rises to π=50%, representing an even chance of correctly 
rejecting the null hypothesis, for an event that causes a drop in stock price 
of γ=2%; that’s more than three times the power of π=16% achieved when 
we use a confidence level of 95%. In fact, with a confidence level of 95%, 
even an event that causes firm price to fall by γ=4.75% isn’t enough to yield 
an even chance of correctly detecting that there was an effect size: power is 
just π=48% in this case. 
 
 
Table 11: How Power Varies with the Confidence Level 
for a High-Volatility Firm 
(σ=3%, Significance threshold = -4.92%) 
True Effect, γ 
(in percentage points) 
Confidence Level 
95% 75% 
0.25 6% 28% 
0.5 7% 31% 
0.75 8% 34% 
1 9% 37% 
1.25 11% 40% 
1.5 13% 43% 
1.65 14% 45% 
1.75 14% 46% 
2 16% 50% 
2.25 19% 53% 
2.5 21% 56% 
2.75 23% 60% 
3 26% 63% 
3.25 29% 66% 
3.5 32% 69% 
3.75 35% 72% 
4 38% 75% 
4.25 41% 77% 
4.5 44% 80% 
4.75 48% 82% 
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We draw together the information in Table 10 and Table 11 in Figure 2 
which plots the power level, on the vertical axis, against the true event 
effect size, on the horizontal axis. The solid (blue and grey) lines plot power 
for the traditional confidence level of CL=95%, with the dashed (orange and 
red) lines plotting power for the more relaxed confidence level of CL=75%. 
All else equal, it can be shown that power is always greater with (i) less 
volatility or (ii) a lower confidence level. That explains why the highest-
power curve is the one for the low-volatility firm (σ=1%) when we use the 
confidence level CL=75%, and also why the lowest-power curve is the one 
for the high-volatility firm (σ=3%) when we use the confidence level 
CL=95%. 
It’s interesting to compare the two middle curves. The dashed (red) one 
plots power for the high-volatility firm with a confidence level of CL=75%, 
and the solid (grey) one plots power for the low-volatility firm with a 
confidence level of CL=95%. For small event effects—those causing stock 
price to drop less than about γ=1.5 percentage points—the high-volatility 
firm with a relaxed confidence level has greater power than the low-
volatility firm with the traditional confidence level. Evidently, the effect of 
relaxing the confidence level is enough to overcome the power disadvantage 
caused by greater volatility, when the true event effect is relatively small. 
For larger event effects, this relationship is reversed: power is greater with 
the low-volatility firm and the traditional, demanding confidence level of 
95% than for the high-volatility firm with a relaxed confidence level.  
This discussion illustrates the complex interplay between power, 
volatility, and confidence level. Power can always be increased by reducing 
the confidence level, and power is always greater for firms with lower 
volatility. But changing both the confidence level and volatility at once has 
ambiguous effects on power.  
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Figure 2: Illustrating How the Power-Effect Size Relationship 
Varies with Volatility and Confidence Level 
 
Horizontal axis: event effect size.  
Vertical axis: power (probability of rejecting the null hypothesis 
     of zero event effect) 
 
Table 12 provides a final vantage point from which to assess the 
relationship between power and the confidence level. The table relates 
values of the confidence level, between CL=95%and CL=50%, to power for 
a test of the null hypothesis that the event had no effect.99 The second and 
third columns involve an event that actually reduced firm price by γ=1%, 
and the fourth and fifth columns involve an event that actually reduced firm 
price by γ=3%.  
  
 
99 A confidence level of 50% entails an even chance of committing a Type I error, i.e., 
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually true. See Gelbach, supra note 12. 
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Table 12: Power Rises as the Required Confidence Level Falls  
(presented by event effect magnitude and firm volatility) 
  𝛾=1% Event Effect   𝛾=3% Event Effect 
  Firm Volatility Level  Firm Volatility Level 
Confidence level Low: σ=1% High: σ=3%  Low: σ=1% High: σ=3% 
95% 26% 9%  91% 26% 
90% 39% 17%  96% 39% 
85% 49% 24%  98% 49% 
80% 56% 31%  98% 56% 
75% 63% 37%  99% 63% 
70% 68% 42%  99% 68% 
65% 73% 48%  100% 73% 
60% 77% 53%  100% 77% 
55% 81% 58%  100% 81% 
50% 84% 63%  100% 84% 
 
All four columns show that as we reduce the required confidence level 
from CL=95%, the power of the test rises.100 Even with a relatively small 
event effect of γ=1% and a high-volatility firm (σ=3%), it is possible to 
achieve power of nearly π=50%—i.e., a nearly even chance of rejecting the 
null hypothesis—by reducing the confidence level from CL=95% to 
CL=65%.   
The table also shows that reductions in the confidence level increase 
power more when the confidence level is initially high. For example, 
reducing it from 95% to 90% increases power by 13 percentage points 
(from 26% to 39%) for a 1% event effect with a low-volatility firm, while 
reducing the confidence level from 75% to 70% increases power by only 5 
percentage points (from π=63% to π=68%). The former power increase is 
more consequential in relative terms as well, because it comes from a lower 
initial level than the latter—just 26% for a confidence level of CL=95%, 
compared to 63% for a confidence level of CL=75%. This observation 
suggests that the tradeoff between confidence level and power is 
characterized by decreasing returns to relaxing the confidence level. 
  
 
100 It is not erroneous that the last column exactly equals the second column. Power is 
the same with a 3% event effect and σ=3% as it is with a 1% event effect and σ=1%.  Thus 
the combination of the low-volatility firm and the small event effect yields the same power 
as the combination of the high-volatility firm and the larger event effect. 
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III. THE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION SHOULD DETERMINE 
THE APPROPRIATE CONFIDENCE LEVEL FOR EVENT STUDIES IN 
SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION 
 
A.  Confidence Level Reflects a Policy Choice  
 
We have shown in Part II that the methodology of event studies 
involves a tradeoff between confidence level and power.  This tradeoff is 
manifested in the various ways that event studies can be used in securities 
fraud litigation – market efficiency, price impact, loss causation and 
damages.  In each case, a higher confidence level increases the probability 
that a price movement will not be deemed sufficiently extreme to meet the 
legal requirement at issue, increasing the difficulty of a successful fraud 
claim.  A higher power level increases the probability that a price 
movement will be accurately characterized as extreme, reducing the 
difficulty of a successful claim.  The true impact of the tradeoff depends on 
the legal context, including both the extent to which the results of the event 
study are dispositive of the legal issue as well as whether the plaintiff bears 
the burden of establishing an extreme price drop or the defendant bears the 
burden of disproving such a drop. 
Importantly, we have also demonstrated that the 95% threshold is not an 
objective measure of scientific validity – it is simply the threshold at which 
the likelihood of a false positive is less than 5%.  Whether that threshold 
should be used as the standard for determining whether an event study is 
admissible or probative is a legal, not a scientific question.  Thus, for 
example, when a court considers an event study purporting to show whether 
stock price has reacted to a corrective disclosure, the court’s task is to 
determine whether the plaintiff, through the introduction of the event study, 
either alone or in conjunction with other evidence, has met its burden of 
establishing loss causation.  The event study, and the significance of its 
result, are simply evidence, and it is for the fact finder to determine the 
weight due to that evidence.  An event study that demonstrates price impact 
with a confidence level of 95% is, presumably, more probative than one that 
demonstrates price impact only at a 90% level, because all else equal, the 
possibility of a false positive is greater in the latter case.  But it is a legal 
question, not one for an expert witness, what standard the evidence must 
meet in any given context.   
In this context, the probabilities associated with confidence level and 
power bear an uncertain relationship to legal standards of proof such as the 
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preponderance standard typically used in the civil context.101 
To be fair, courts appear to believe that they are applying proven 
standards of scientific validity to the question of whether an event study 
purports to demonstrate a causal effect between a disclosure and a stock 
price movement.102  The problem is that the question of when a statistical 
result is compelling enough to count as scientific knowledge is quite a 
different one from the question of when evidence is strong enough to satisfy 
the policy considerations that drive standards of evidence in regulation 
and/or court.103 Several commentators have criticized courts for their 
willingness to treat empirical data as scientific fact instead of recognizing 
that the decision to treat it as reliable or probative is inherently a legal 
question.104  
In addition, in the social sciences, event studies do not generally take 
the form that they do in securities fraud litigation and are used for different 
purposes.  As we have observed in other work, “there are important 
differences between the scholarly contexts for which event studies were 
originally designed and the use of event studies in securities fraud 
litigation.”105  In importing the event study methodology into securities 
fraud litigation and, in particular, to address the question of whether a 
particular disclosure has affected the price of a single firm, courts must  
make adjustments to the standard methodology as well as making 
judgments about the legal significance of reported results.106   
How should this legal judgment be made?  We argue that, because of 
the tradeoff between confidence level and power and the resulting effect on 
the scope of viable securities fraud cases, the confidence level should be 
 
101 See Gelbach, supra note 12 for an extensive discussion on this point. For a judicial 
acknowledgment of the point, see United States v. Hatfield, 795 F. Supp. 2d 219, 234 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Preponderance of the evidence does not anywhere near require 95% 
certainty, and Professor Harris' study should have made accommodations for this lower 
evidentiary burden.”). 
102 Whether courts are competent to resolve that scientific question is unclear and 
delegating to expert witnesses both the standards by which their opinions are to be evaluated 
and the legal significance to be given them is problematic.  See Ryan D. Enos, Anthony 
Fowler, & Christopher S. Havasy, The Negative Effect Fallacy: A Case Study of Incorrect 
Statistical Reasoning by Federal Courts, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 618, 647 (2017) 
(identifying “the challenges associated with interpreting statistical evidence in federal 
courts” and offering proposals for reform). 
103 See Gelbach, supra note 12 for more on this set of issues. 
104 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Is Expert Evidence Really 
Different? 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2013), or Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social 
Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. 
REV. 477, 490-91 (1986) (arguing that empirical information should be viewed as analogous 
to law and receive similar treatment by courts as legal precedent).   
105 Fisch, et al., supra note 7 at 557. 
106 We identify several such adjustments in Fisch, et al., supra note 7. 
42 POWER AND STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE [13-Apr-20 
chosen in a way that is sensitive to the likelihood of detecting frauds when 
they have actually occurred.107   
Consider, for example, the context of loss causation.  Plaintiffs have the 
burden of establishing loss causation,108 and, as noted in Part I, courts have 
consistently concluded that the production of a reliable event study is a 
necessary prerequisite for plaintiffs to meet that burden.109  Thus the choice 
of the appropriate confidence level necessary for an event study is likely to 
be outcome determinative.110  Simply put, frauds that impact stock price 
below a certain magnitude, a magnitude that varies depending on stock 
price and volatility, simply are not actionable despite the fact that the 
economic impact of these frauds on the market and investors can be quite 
substantial. 
There is nothing inherently problematic in basing a determination of the 
appropriate confidence level on its expected effect on the incidence and 
outcome of securities fraud cases and, in turn on the effect of overall 
litigation levels and success rates on investors and the capital markets.111   
An extensive literature debates the merits of securities fraud litigation and 
questions whether the existing legal standards adequately balance the 
benefits of deterring fraud and compensating injured investors against the 
cost of frivolous litigation and the systemic burdens imposed by litigation.  
Our claim is simply that the choice of confidence level plays an important 
role in that balance and should therefore be informed by these 
considerations rather than being treated as some kind of exogenously-
 
107 We note that use of event studies is primarily in the context of private litigation as, 
to date, most event studies have been directed to the elements of reliance and loss causation.  
Our observations apply to government enforcement actions, however, although to a more 
limited degree.  See, e.g., SEC v. Berlacher, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95759, *21 (E.D. Pa) 
(rejecting SEC’s insider trading case based on event study by plaintiff’s expert asserting that 
size of stock price movements in responses to disclosures reflected typical market volatility 
and resulting conclusion that disclosures were not material); United States v. Ferguson, 584 
F. Supp. 2d 447( relying on event studies to calculate size of the loss caused by defendants 
conduct for purposes of criminal sentencing). 
108 See Halliburton II. 
109 In contrast, some courts have concluded that event studies may be useful in 
establishing market efficiency but are not required.  See notes 39 through 41 supra and 
accompanying text  Similarly, the question of price impact typically arises at the class 
certification stage at which it is the defendant’s burden to establish lack of price impact.   
110 See, e.g. Robert N. Rapp, Plausible Cause: Exploring the Limits of Loss Causation 
In Pleading and Proving Market Fraud Claims Under Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) and 
SEC Rule 10b-5, 41 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 389, 394 (2015) (highlighting “the determinative role 
of loss causation in pleading and proving [securities fraud]”). 
111 We recognize that the policy considerations that we identify may operate differently 
depending on the element to which an event study is addressed.  Accordingly, our Article 
does not argue that a single level of statistical significance is required across the different 
legal contexts.   
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determined scientific truth.   
 
B.  The SEC is Best-Positioned to Make the Choice of Confidence Level 
 
Federal courts currently determine the appropriate confidence level 
when event studies are introduced in securities fraud litigation, either 
through the application of Daubert standards to the introduction of expert 
testimony or in determining the extent to which a particular event study 
meets the standard required to prove an element of the case.  As indicated 
above, the court have overwhelmingly required that event studies 
demonstrate statistical significance at the 95% confidence level commonly 
used in the social science literature.  As we have demonstrated in prior 
Parts, this requirement has a substantial impact on the likelihood of false 
negatives.  With limited exceptions, however, courts have not considered 
either the tradeoff between confidence level and power or the extent to 
which their choice of confidence level imposes too high a burden on 
establishing fraud.   
Because federal securities fraud litigation is based on an implied cause 
of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the task of 
determining the required elements of proof as well as the standards 
necessary to satisfy those elements has fallen to the federal courts as a 
matter of common law rulemaking.  Courts have used a variety of 
approaches, from seeking guidance from the statutory text or legislative 
history to an explicit analysis of policy considerations.  But with respect to 
confidence levels, the courts’ approach appears to be a matter of inertia. 
Because federal judges are not typically trained empiricists,112 they rely on 
expert testimony which cites the standard used in academic studies and do 
not engage with the question of whether that standard should be applied in 
the litigation context.  
Once the policy considerations implicit in the choice of confidence level 
are exposed, however, it becomes clear that although courts are wrong to 
accept blindly the 95% confidence level, the judiciary also is not the best-
situated branch of government to determine whether or how to modify that 
standard.  First, as noted above, judges are not trained empiricists.  Most 
judges are lawyers, and although modern legal training has been heavily 
influenced by law and economics, “a standard legal education does not 
include rigorous training in statistics or the evaluation of scientific 
evidence.”113  Indeed, an extensive literature details the various ways in 
 
112 Enos et al., supra note 102 at 619.  
113 Id.. 
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which courts get statistical analysis wrong.114  
More importantly, determining an appropriate confidence level requires 
more than skill in empirical methods.  Courts must understand and evaluate 
the tradeoff in the context of its effect on securities fraud litigation.  Here 
again, federal courts are inexpert.  Although private plaintiffs file hundreds 
of securities fraud cases per year,115 as of 2019, there were 677 authorized 
federal judgeships nationwide.116  Most district court judges are likely to go 
years without encountering a single securities fraud case.117  In addition, 
district court judges may not be exposed to their colleagues’ cases, and they 
lack ready tools to share information and coordinate their decisions outside 
of the normal process of publishing their decisions . 
 Third and most importantly, federal judges can neither monitor the 
market and determine whether the existing level of enforcement is 
appropriate nor evaluate the potential impact on market protection from 
adopting a given confidence level.  A court hearing a securities fraud case 
learns only about a single firm and a single set of disclosures.  There is no 
place in the case for the introduction of the disclosure practices of other 
firms, the percentage of disclosures that give rise to litigation or the extent 
to which litigation successfully deters fraud or compensated injured 
investors.  Indeed, these factors fail Fed. R. Evid. 401’s definition of 
relevance, because none makes a fact of consequence in the instant action 
more or less probable. Federal courts do not see cases that lawyers do not 
file.  They do not see investor losses that are not pursued through litigation.  
And they do not evaluate developments in issuer disclosure practices that 
 
114 See, e.g., D. James Greiner, The Quantitative Empirics of Redistricting Litigation: 
Knowledge, Threats to Knowledge, and the Need for Less Districting, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y 
REV. 527, 536-38 (2011); Wendy K. Tam Cho & Albert H. Yoon, Strange Bedfellows: 
Politics, Courts, and Statistics: Statistical Expert Testimony in Voting Rights Cases, 10 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 237, 239 (2001); Bernard Grofman, Multivariate Methods and 
the Analysis of Racially Polarized Voting: Pitfalls in the Use of Social Science by the Courts, 
72 SOC. SCI. Q. 826, 827-28 (1991); Thomas J. Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII 
Cases: Minimum Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics 
Meet, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1302-05 (1984) 
115 Cornerstone Research, Federal Class Action Securities Fraud Filings Continue at 
Near-Record Pace, July 31, 2019, https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Press-
Releases/Federal-Class-Action-Securities-Fraud-Filings-Continue-at-Near-Record-Pace 
116 Admin. Off. Of the Courts, The Judiciary Fiscal Year 2020 Congressional Budget 
Summary, Feb. 2019, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fy_2020_congressional_budget_summary_0.pd
f. 
117 Filings are concentrated in courts in three districts, the Central and Northern Districts 
of California and the Southern District of New York.  See Lynn A. Baker, Michael A. Perino 
& Charles Silver, Is the Price Right? An Empirical Study of Fee-Setting in Securities Class 
Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1390 (2015) (terming these “high volume” districts).   
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result from the modification of legal standards118 or the effect of those 
disclosure changes on the market.119  
What about Congress, then?  Despite the extensive development 
through decisional law, at its core, federal securities fraud litigation is based 
on a statute.  Moreover, the policy questions that we raise certainly feel like 
ones that are appropriate for legislation. 
Here we have three primary concerns.  First, it seems implausible that 
the technical issue that we raise is likely to command congressional 
attention.  Congress moves slowly, and there is little reason to believe that 
Congress either has the interest in addressing these issues appropriately or 
would usefully harness appropriate expert input.  Second, changing the 
confidence level is likely to change the viability of securities litigation, and 
it will be difficult to predict the full effects of such changes.  As a result, 
legal changes in this area are best implemented in a flexible manner that can 
be refined over time.  This approach does not characterize legislation; 
although Congress can occasionally be prompted to turn its attention to this 
type of policymaking, it rarely revisits a matter even after it has introduced 
substantial changes.  The last major legislation related to securities litigation 
was enacted more than 20 years ago.120  Third, the analysis we suggest is 
precisely the type of determination by made by an administrative agency 
which has both the scientific tools and the detailed familiarity with the 
securities markets required.  The SEC’s expertise is precisely the reason 
that Congress delegates lawmaking to administrative agencies through the 
rulemaking process. 
This takes us then to the SEC.  To be clear, the case for the SEC to 
determine confidence level through rulemaking is more than just process of 
elimination. For one thing, we believe it is well—and deliberately—
positioned to regulate the private securities litigation landscape. As 
Professor Joseph Grundfest wrote a quarter century ago, before the 
PSLRA’s enactment: 
 
Congress created the Commission as an expert agency with the capacity to 
address significant problems affecting the nation's securities markets. 
Congress also created the Commission as an agency that could thoughtfully 
address problems too politically charged to be easily resolved on Capitol 
Hill. Congress then delegated to the Commission substantial authority to 
 
118 See, e.g., Karen K. Nelson & A. C. Pritchard, Carrot or Stick? The Shift from 
Voluntary to Mandatory Disclosure of Risk Factors, 13 J. EMPIR. LEGAL STUD. 266, 267 
(2016) (detailing responsiveness of issuer disclosures to litigation risk). 
119 See, e.g., John L. Campbell et al., The Information Content of Mandatory Risk Factor 
Disclosures in Corporate Filings, 19 REV. ACCT. STUD. 396, 398 (2014) (identifying the 
effects of risk factor disclosures on market beta and stock price volatility). 
120 PSLRA, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). 
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define the contours of market activity that would create liability for fraud. 
In light of the  rationales for the Commission's existence and the scope of 
the relevant Congressional delegation, and in light of the Commission's 
expertise in litigation matters and the contentious nature of the underlying 
policy claims, the private securities litigation debate is precisely the sort of 
intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is 
appropriate. For the Commission to continue to avoid the private securities 
fraud litigation debate, which now stands as one of the major policy disputes 
facing this nation's securities markets—and which is just the sort of 
controversy that Congress created the Commission to resolve—is for the 
Commission to evade its responsibility and to betray its raison d'etre.121 
 
This extended quotation raises two noteworthy issues. First, the SEC 
exists to deploy judgment on at least two dimensions. One is the familiar 
dimension of technical prowess—addressing issues that require knowing 
how the capital markets’ plumbing works, understanding academic or 
technical economics, and so on. The other dimension of judgment involves 
combining such technical expertise with normative policy considerations. 
Ultimately, decision makers at the SEC make policy choices. It is 
appropriate for them to decide (for example) that they are willing to tolerate 
more frauds in order to reduce the extent of litigation costs, or vice-versa. 
Agency policy goals will more effectively achieve the decision makers’ 
aims if the decision makers are better informed with respect to technical 
questions; this point underscores the classical role of agency expertise. But 
as at other agencies, SEC officials make policy. Deciding on a standard of 
evidence for event studies used in securities litigation fits both dimensions 
of agency judgment, because it involves the combination of normative 
policy judgments with technical judgments.  
Professor Grundfest wrote this passage to address the question of 
whether the SEC could or should act administratively to redirect 
enforcement authority away from private litigants and toward itself. He 
pointed out that the 10b-5 cause of action is a judicial creation, “articulated 
in neither statute, legislative history, nor regulation.” The same is true of the 
common use of the 95% confidence level. This standard is used in litigation 
because it has been imported from academia by expert witnesses and courts 
that lacked a clearly articulated alternative. There is no reason this state of 
affairs should be regarded as unchangeable.  
The SEC has long employed economists with technical expertise in 
statistical reasoning and methods. And the SEC’s Division of Economic and 
Risk Analysis (DERA), which was created in 2009, has the express purpose 
of “integrat[ing] financial economics and rigorous data analytics into the 
 
121 Joseph Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities 
Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963, 966-967 (1994).  
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core mission of the SEC.”122 The SEC current employs approximately 64 
trained economists who can help translate the technical issues for 
Commissioners. The deployment of their expertise in the ways we suggest 
would vindicate the long-recognized justification for situating policy 
making authority in agencies. Moreover, the SEC is currently structured to 
address these questions.  One of DERA’s activities is reviewing market 
developments for the purpose of “identifying and analyzing issues, trends, 
and innovations in the marketplace.”  Within DERA, the SEC has set up the 
office of litigation economics, which provides litigation support and 
analysis.   
Although there is no indication from the SEC’s website that the SEC 
staff currently evaluates the effectiveness of either public or private 
enforcement of the antifraud provision, the staff has both the tools and the 
competence to do so.  The SEC already collects and reports statistics on its 
enforcement of Rule 10b-5.123  Private organizations such as Cornerstone 
collect and report data on both public and private enforcement actions.124 It 
is possible to analyze this data according to a variety of metrics to evaluate 
the criteria by which filing decisions are made such as the extent of price 
movement or overall market loss associated with an alleged fraudulent 
disclosure as well as the market reaction to those cases.  In recent work, 
Stephen Choi analyzes much of this data to offer preliminary measures to 
assess the SEC’s use of its enforcement discretion and the impact of its 
enforcement decisions over time.125 
What the SEC can also access, and what academics and other third 
parties cannot, is data on cases that do not result in either public or private 
enforcement actions.  The SEC could collect data on corrective disclosures 
that do not result in litigation to evaluate the price impact associated with 
such disclosures and to determine whether litigation under existing 
empirical standards would be viable.  The SEC could analyze non-public 
data from its investigations and settled cases.  The SEC could incorporate 
 
122 SEC, About the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, 
https://www.sec.gov/dera/about. 
123 See Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s 
Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 902 (2016) (describing SEC’s current 
disclosure of its enforcement activities and calling for better quality data collection and 
reporting). 
124 See Cornerstone Research and NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business, SEC 
Enforcement Activity: Public Companies and Subsidiaries Fiscal Year 2019 Update (2019) 
available at https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-
FY-2019-Update (reporting data on SEC enforcement against public companies); 
Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings, 2018 Year in Review, 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2018-
Year-in-Review (reporting data on private class actions). 
125 Stephen J. Choi, Measuring the Impact of SEC Enforcement (working paper 2020). 
48 POWER AND STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE [13-Apr-20 
data from preliminary investigations that do not result in enforcement 
actions.   And the SEC could compare the scope of its own enforcement 
activity with private litigation to determine the extent to which public and 
private enforcement actions are complementary or duplicative in addressing 
fraudulent behavior.   
The SEC already evaluates, on the individual case level, the effect of 
enforcement on the securities market in the exercise of its prosecutorial 
discretion.  Market impact – including the message that enforcement will 
send to other market participants – is one of the factors that influences both 
the SEC’s decision to bring an enforcement action and the type and level of 
sanctions it seeks.   
The SEC’s economists also have the empirical skills to model the 
potential impact of the methodological choices reflected in this article.  
Indeed, the SEC has, on occasion, engaged in detailed economic analyzes 
for the purpose of quantifying the impact of regulatory changes on market 
behavior. Thus, for example in 2004, the SEC created a one-year pilot to 
evaluate the effect of revised regulations concerning short selling.126  The 
SEC staff evaluated the pilot in a report which was released in 2007.127  In 
2012, in connection with its consideration of reforms to the rules governing 
money market funds, the SEC staff empirically analyzed both the efficacy 
of prior regulatory reforms and the potential impact of additional reforms on 
the market, using a variety of complex empirical procedures, e.g., including 
Monte Carlo simulations.128 
Finally, the SEC has the flexibility necessary to engage in effective 
rulemaking with respect to confidence level.  As detailed further below, the 
SEC can evaluate the extent to which the policy-based choice of confidence 
level is affected by volatility, market capitalization and industry as well as 
tailoring its requirements to reflect differences in the legal question to 
which the event study evidence is addressed.  The SEC can also study the 
effect of its initial rule and make subsequent adjustments without the 
barriers associated with formal legislation.   
 
 
126 See, e.g., David P. McCaffrey, Review of the Policy Debate over Short Sale 
Regulation During the Market Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 483, 487-88 (2010) (describing the 
pilot). 
127 Office of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Economic Analysis of the 
Short Sale Price Restrictions Under the Regulation SHO Pilot 56 (2007), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2007/regshopilot020607.pdf. 
128 Div. of Risk, Strategy, & Fin. Innovation, Response to Questions Posed by 
Commissioners Aguilar, Paredes, and Gallagher, U. S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 7 (Nov. 30, 
2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/money-market-funds-memo-2012.pdf. 
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C.  The SEC has the Authority to Regulate the Use of Event Studies in 
Litigation  
 
We also believe that, as a matter of administrative law, the SEC would 
be on solid ground if it adopted rules related to the use of event studies in 
securities litigation. Perhaps the least persuasive case would be that an 
interpretative rule interpreting Rule 10b-5 with respect to the use of event 
studies in court would pass muster under Auer v. Robins.129 Although we 
think this position is likely right under current law, Auer deference is not 
the only route, nor obviously the best choice by itself. The SEC has broad 
legislative rule making powers under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.130 Indeed, Rule 10b-5131 itself was promulgated under a provision of 
the ’34 Act that is now codified at 15 U.S.C § 78j. That section of the 
statute explicitly grants the Commission power to create “such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors” in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities.132  
Thus the SEC has authority to use notice-and-comment rulemaking to 
promulgate a rule setting forth a broad framework for the use of event 
studies in 10b-5 actions. The SEC could then issue interpretative rules that 
put meat on the bones of the framework rule in order to answer specific 
questions such as the confidence level to be used in court. This approach 
would allow successive administrations to set and change policy regarding 
the use of event studies in securities litigation as they saw fit, as we believe 
is appropriate, provided that the usual requirements of administrative 
lawmaking are satisfied. 
One might wonder, though, whether a litigation standard of evidence is 
the sort of legal question on which the SEC does or should be considered to 
have lawmaking authority. Perhaps one might think that litigation standards 
should be left to courts. We have already explained, in Part III.B, why we 
think common-law judging is not the best source of law making for the 
standard of evidence in event study use for litigation. But could the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence be amended to 
address the question of statistical proof? 
Such a Rule would be illegitimate, because it would be outside the 
domain of the Rules Enabling Act.133 That Act limits Congressional 
delegation of rulemaking authority to procedural, practice, and evidence 
 
129 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
130 48 Stat. 891 (1934). 
131 17 CFR 240.10b-5. 
132 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
133 28 U.S.C. § 2072.  
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rules that do not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”134 The 
confidence level is a component of the standard of evidence—akin to the 
choice between the preponderance, clear-and-convincing, or reasonable 
doubt standards. To the extent that the substance-procedure dichotomy is 
useful (and the Rules Enabling Act makes it a necessary evil), the standard 
of evidence is therefore substantive.135 Thus, the confidence level applied to 
event studies used in securities litigation is not the sort of legal rule that 
could be addressed through the Rules Enabling Act.136 
Our discussion throughout this Article shows that the confidence level 
plays a critical role in the likelihood that alleged securities frauds will be 
treated as proved ones. Accordingly, this statistical standard is a core aspect 
of the 10b-5 action. Recall Professor Grundfest’s description of the SEC’s 
role: the agency was created to “thoughtfully address problems too 
politically charged to be easily resolved” by Congress; it was “delegated … 
substantial authority to define the contours of market activity that would 
create liability for fraud”; it is well-positioned for an “intricate, labor-
intensive task” carried out by an “expert body”; and it has a “responsibility” 
to weigh in on major policy issues.137 Thus, given how well-positioned the 
SEC is to address the issue of the confidence level to be applied to event 
studies used in securities litigation, and given that the substantive nature of 
the question places it outside the purview of the judicial rulemaking 
process, it is hard to see why the SEC’s legislative rulemaking authority 
should somehow fail to apply.138  
 
 
134 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
135 On this point see the discussion in Part IV of Gelbach, Estimation Evidence, supra 
note 12 (discussing Supreme Court decisions under which preponderance is the default rule 
because “[a]ny other standard expresses a preference for one side's interests,” Herman & 
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983)). 
136 There is some question as to whether the operative statutory text should be ignored. 
Justice Scalia argued that it should, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 559 U.S. 393, 413 (2010) (siding with precedential statutory interpretation that 
concededly is “hard to square with § 2072(b)'s terms”) (Scalia, J., in a portion of the opinion 
that spoke for three Justices). But the Court has since repudiated that view in two additional 
cases. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (citing § 2072(b) as the 
reason for the majority’s decision in the case) (Scalia, J.); and Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016) (rejecting petitioner’s attempt to have evidence 
deemed improper, simply because the case is a Rule 23 class action, because that would 
contravene § 2072(b) by abridging a substantive right) (Kennedy, J.).  
137 Grundfest, supra note 121 at 966-967.  
138 In addition, Professor Grundfest has argued that the SEC has the lawful power to 
disimply the 10b-5 action entirely.  Id. If the SEC has power to eliminate 10b-5 actions 
altogether, then presumably the SEC has the power to alter the standards by which such 
actions are proved.  
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D.  Summary 
 
In sum, conventional administrative law arguments establish that the 
SEC has authority to set general standards of evidence for securities 
litigation; such authority includes the power to devise rules for the 
confidence level to be applied in hypothesis testing used with event studies 
used in 10b-5 litigation. For familiar reasons, neither Congress nor courts in 
their common law function are likely to make these policy choices well or 
appropriately. And the substantive-law nature of the task makes the judicial 
rulemaking process illegitimate. Thus, the SEC is the right institutional 
player to address standard of evidence in securities litigation. 
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR CHOOSING THE CONFIDENCE LEVEL IN LIGHT OF 
THE TRADEOFF WITH POWER 
 
Our discussion in Part II shows that there is a tradeoff between a test’s 
confidence level and its power. Choosing the CL amounts to a 
straightforward tradeoff of the costs associated with our two types of errors. 
By reducing the CL, we increase the frequency of Type I errors, which 
induces added litigation by plaintiffs and additional pre-litigation defensive 
behavior by defendants. We will call these costs the “litigation costs” 
related to a drop in the confidence level. But because the frequency of Type 
II errors falls when we reduce the confidence level, doing so entails a drop 
in the countervailing costs related to Type II errors that occur when we fail 
to discern frauds that did occur. Reducing the confidence level means that 
actual fraudsters will be more likely to avoid detection, so that “fraud costs” 
are reduced when we reduce the confidence level. 
Choosing a confidence level involves trading off these litigation costs 
and fraud costs. It is important to recognize that the optimal tradeoff 
between these types of costs is not simply a positive, technical question. 
Rather, it is a normative question—and thus a policy choice: Which frauds 
are costly enough to justify incurring litigation costs?  
The discussion in Part II shows that power can be very low—and, thus, 
Type II error rates can be very high—when courts impose the 5% Type I 
error rate. It also shows that power can be increased if one is willing to 
tolerate a higher Type I error rate, or, equivalently, a lower confidence 
level.  One view of the state of play in 10b-5 litigation is that courts have 
consciously chosen to use the 95% confidence level because they have 
determined that it yields the optimal tradeoff between litigation and fraud 
costs. This is the position taken by Fox, Fox, and Gilson.139  
 
139 Fox, et al., supra note 55.  
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We question the claim that the current use of the 95% confidence level 
reflects a conscious policy choice as opposed to a reflexive reliance on the 
social science literature.  As a result, we offer a framework to make that 
policy choice: what critical value best balances the litigation costs 
associated with Type I error rates against the fraud costs associated with 
Type II error rates.  
Section A introduces a formal framework based on conventional 
neoclassical economic welfare analysis, premised on optimal deterrence 
analysis. We show that optimal policy depends on (i) positive components 
related to the impact, on the number of frauds and the amount of litigation, 
of the critical value for finding a test significant, and (ii) normative 
components related to the degrees to which fraud and litigation each impose 
costs on society. Unfortunately, even the positive components are likely to 
be difficult if not impossible to estimate convincingly. Accordingly, section 
B provides a practically feasible alternative approach, one that we believe 
forges an appropriate compromise between practicality and analytical 
precision. 
 
A.  A Formal Analytical Framework 
 
One approach to our policy choice problem would be to conceive it as 
one of minimizing total social costs related to fraud costs and litigation 
costs. Thus, policy would be chosen to  
 
minimize 𝐶(𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑, 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛), 
 
where 𝐶 is a function that tells us total social costs for given levels of the 
variables 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 and 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛.  
A decrease in the confidence level CL has the effect of making it easier 
for plaintiffs to prove fraud. Accordingly, a reduction in CL can be 
expected to reduce fraud and increase litigation. Other things equal, total 
social costs fall when fraud rises and rise when litigation rises. The net 
impact on total social costs of a reduction in CL may be written  
 
ΔSC =  ΔSC  × ΔFraud
   
+ ΔSC  × ΔLitigation
   
 
  
where ΔSC   is the reduction in total social costs due to a 
reduction in fraud when CL is reduced, ΔFraud is the magnitude of the 
reduction in 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 due to that reduction in CL, ΔSC   is the 
increase in social costs due to the reduction in CL, and ΔLitigation is the 
corresponding increase in litigation caused by a reduction in CL.  
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A reduction in CL will reduce total social costs—ΔSC will be 
negative—if the fraud-reduction effect outweighs the litigation-increase 
effect. A reduction in CL will increase total social costs—ΔSC will be 
positive—if the litigation-increase effect is the larger one. It will make 
sense to reduce CL further in the former situation, when ΔSC is negative, 
and it will make sense to instead tamp back on the drop in CL in the latter 
situation, when ΔSC is positive. That means the value of CL is optimal only 
if the marginal social cost effect of fraud reduction exactly counterbalances 
the marginal social cost effect of litigation increase.  
For example, suppose one fraud reduces social costs by $1 million, and 
suppose that a contemplated reduction in CL would eliminate 4 frauds. 
Then the reduction in CL would have a fraud-reduction impact on total 
social costs of $4 million. If we suppose that increasing the number of cases 
litigated by one increases total social costs by $2 million, then the 
contemplated reduction in CL would make sense as long as it increased 
litigation by fewer than 2 cases: for any smaller increase in litigation, the 
increase in social costs due to increased litigation would amount to less than 
$4 million. On the other hand, if litigation were to increase by more than 2 
cases, the litigation-increase impact on social costs would outweigh the 
fraud-reduction impact, in which case it would not make sense to reduce CL 
(indeed, it would probably make sense to increase it). This example shows 
that it can make sense to allow a more relaxed evidentiary standard for 
plaintiffs in securities litigation even if the number of frauds eliminated 
differs from the number of additional cases litigated. The key is that the 
social cost impact of each eliminated fraud may differ from the social cost 
impact of each additional litigated case.  
Our discussion shows that a full-fledged optimal policy analysis 
requires both positive and normative information. The positive information 
involves the impact of changes in the confidence level on the prevalence of 
litigation and the impact of changes in the confidence level on the 
prevalence of securities fraud. These two factors tell us how litigant and 
executive behavior change with the confidence level. The normative 
information required involves how social welfare is affected by litigation 
costs and by the prevalence of securities fraud. 
In principle, the positive questions could be answered using statistical 
analysis. In practice, providing high-quality answers to these questions is 
likely to be difficult. One issue is that the prevalence of fraud will be hard 
to measure in those instances in which frauds are not detected. Another is 
that we lack meaningful empirical variation in the confidence level used in 
litigation to date. Surely there are other hurdles that will complicate a 
complete analysis of how the confidence level affects litigation and fraud 
prevalence. 
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The normative questions are also difficult to answer. Valuing social 
welfare effects requires a complete specification of distributional concerns. 
In the securities litigation context, that requires considering the returns to 
lawyers, to class action plaintiffs, the costs borne by firms, the incidence of 
those costs borne distinctly by shareholders and workers, the effects on 
employment, and so on. 
We regard the classical social welfare analysis as functionally infeasible 
for the SEC (or anyone else) to carry out. We therefore offer a practical 
approach to choosing the confidence level used in securities litigation in 
Part IV.B. 
 
B.  An Informal but Feasible Approach to Setting Policy 
 
We have seen that the current approach leads to a situation in which 
Type II error rates can be expected to be very high even when fraud of a 
significant magnitude has occurred. Our feasible approach to policy making 
is founded on the idea of directly assessing a policy maker’s willingness to 
accept a given rate of failing to detect actual frauds of a given magnitude, in 
return for keeping as low as possible the rate of concluding that a fraud has 
occurred when it actually hasn’t. The key variables in our method are the 
magnitude of fraud, the Type II error rate for that magnitude, and the Type I 
error rate.  As we explain, if values of these two variables are together 
sufficient to determine the confidence level that should be used for any 
given litigation.  
We emphasize that the SEC might have reason to let the values of these 
variables differ by firm type, so that different cases will have different 
confidence levels.  For example, the SEC’s determination may be affected 
by evidence about the relationship between firms’ market capitalization and 
the incidence of fraud or its social costs. Additionally, firms with higher 
volatility might face greater risk of frivolous litigation based on large 
magnitude stock drops.  For these reasons, the SEC might reasonably vary 
the minimum required power depending on firms’ market capitalization, 
volatility, or other characteristics that can be quantified and studied in 
advance.   
Whatever the mechanism the SEC uses to answer these questions, we 
suggest it use the following procedure: 
 
1. Choose a policy-salient magnitude of fraud. This amount might 
be $50 million; or maybe it’s $1 billion. The requirement is only 
to pick some value of interest.   
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2. Choose a minimum required power level, 𝜋  , for detecting 
frauds of the stated magnitude. For example, the SEC might 
decide that a $100 million fraud should be detected at least half 
the time when it happens. In this case, 𝜋 =50%; equivalently, 
this means the maximum allowable Type II error rate is 𝛽 =
100% − 𝜋 = 50%.  We emphasize that the SEC’s minimum 
required power level might be influenced by the agency’s 
information about the likely level of undetected capital markets 
fraud, based on information from its enforcement division, 
market statistics such as trading spreads, volume of customer 
complaints, and so forth.  Thus, the minimum required power 
could be different for different types of firms. 
3. For the firm being sued, set 𝛾∗ equal to the ratio of the 
magnitude of fraud, from step 1, to the firm’s market 
capitalization. We refer to 𝛾∗ as the policy-relevant event effect 
magnitude, expressed in percentage terms. 
4. Calculate the defendant firm’s daily abnormal return volatility as 
measured by its standard deviation, σ.140 
5. Set 𝛼∗ equal to the Type I error rate that corresponds to a Type II 
error rate of 𝛽  for a firm with volatility σ when the effect 
size is 𝛾∗. 
6. Do a standard event study-based hypothesis test at significance 
level 𝛼∗ (equivalently, confidence level 𝐶𝐿∗ = 100% − 𝛼∗). 
 
To illustrate this procedure, suppose a firm with market capitalization of 
$5 billion has been sued. Suppose that a policy maker considers a $50 
million fraud to be significant. Then 𝛾∗ = 1%. The bottom curve in Figure 
3 shows the possible combinations  of Type I and Type II error rates for a 
𝛾∗ = 1% fraud when the firm’s standard deviation is σ=1%. We will call 
this the “error rate combination curve”. Any point on the error rate 
combination curve is feasible for the SEC, in the sense that choosing a 
given Type I error rate will yield the Type II error rate on the curve when 
the true effect is 𝛾∗ = 1%. 
 
140 In this section, we continue to assume, for the sake of exposition, that the firm’s 
abnormal returns are normally distributed. See Part IV.C for the required modification when 
abnormal returns are not normally distributed. 
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Figure 3: The Error Rate Combination Curve Showing the Tradeoff 
Between Type II (β) and Type I (α) Error Rates for a Magnitude of Fraud of 
γ=1 Percent 
 
 
We saw above in Table 8 that for a γ=1% true effect with a low-
volatility firm (σ=1%), a confidence level of CL=95% corresponds to power 
of only π=26%. This is equivalent to saying that the Type I error rate of 
α=5% brings a Type II error rate of 74%.141 In other words, the “price” of 
insisting on a confidence level of 95% is that event study tests will miss 3 
out of every 4 frauds of magnitude $50 million with a $5 billion low-
volatility firm. 
Suppose the SEC decides this is too high a price to pay and instead 
believes that it is important to ensure that there is a 𝜋 = 50% chance of 
detecting that size fraud. Then in Figure 3’s terms, this policy maker must 
choose the point of intersection between the bottom error rate combination 
curve and the horizontal dotted line indicating the Type II error rate is 
β=50%. The dotted line drawn down to the horizontal axis from this point 
of intersection shows that the corresponding Type I error rate is 16%. That 
means the SEC should mandate a significance level of 𝛼∗ = 16%, rather 
than the 5% typically used by courts now, when a $5 billion firm with 
 
141 Recall that the Type II error rate satisfies β=100%-π; see Table 5. 
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σ=1% is sued. Another way to say it is that the SEC should insist on a 
confidence level of CL*=84% rather than the value of 95% typically 
required now. 
What if the firm has higher volatility? The top error rate combination 
curve (dashed or in red) in Figure 3 plots the Type II error rate associated 
with each Type I error rate for a firm with standard deviation σ=3%, 
retaining the assumption that the magnitude of fraud of interest is $50 
million and the firm’s market value is $5 billion, so that the SEC again sets 
𝛾∗ = 1%. The figure shows that the line where the Type II error rate is 
β=50% intersects the error rate combination curve at a Type I error rate of 
37%. Thus, if the SEC adopts a policy of mandating power of at least 
π=50% for a $50 million fraud, Figure 3 indicates the SEC should set the 
significance level to α=37%—equivalently, set the confidence level to 
CL=63%—when a $5 billion high-volatility firm (σ=3%) is sued. 
Figure 3 thus shows two key points. First, holding constant the 
defendant firm’s market capitalization at $5 billion, the SEC should require 
a confidence level substantially below the academic choice of 95% if it 
wants to ensure the probability of a correct decision will be at least 50% 
when a fraud of $50 million has occurred. This is true even if the firm’s 
stock has low volatility. Second, the degree of stock price volatility matters 
a lot. For a low-volatility firm (σ=1%), obtaining power of π=50% for a $50 
million fraud would entail reducing the confidence level to 84%, which 
means a threshold stock-price drop of 1% be statistically significant.142  The 
threshold price drop is the same, 1%, for a high-volatility firm (σ=3%), but 
because that firm’s stock returns are more variable, setting minimum 
required power equal to 50% implies the confidence level is just CL=63%.  
In other words, although the threshold price drop is the same regardless of 
the firms’ volatility, that threshold is much more commonly achieved for 
the high-volatility firm.143  This result reflects one of our key points: 
 
142 This can be seen by using the equation in footnote 89, setting Φ 𝑧 + = 0.5 
and solving for CL. Because Φ(0) = 0.5, we must have 𝑧 + = 0, which implies 
𝑧 = − . Because γ and σ both equal 1 when the policy-salient event effect magnitude is 
1% of market capitalization and the firm has low volatility, we have 𝑧 = −1.  This means 
the threshold drop in stock price to find a significant effect must be 1%. The value of 1-CL 
for which this holds is 0.16 (i.e., the 0.16-quantile of the standard normal distribution has 
value -1), so the implied confidence level is 100%-16%=84%. 
143 On the same argument as used in the previous footnote, we again have 𝑧 = − . 
We still have γ=1%, but with our high-volatility firm we now have σ=3%. It follows that 
𝑧 = −1/3.  The value of 1-CL for which this holds is 0.37 (i.e., the 0.37-quantile of the 
standard normal distribution has value -1), so the implied confidence level is 100%-
37%=63%.  Because the high-volatility firm has standard deviation σ=3%, the 37th percentile 
 
58 POWER AND STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE [13-Apr-20 
because the test has lower power for a firm with higher volatility, all else 
equal we should demand a lower Type I error rate for a higher volatility 
firm. 
This example assumed that the minimum required power for detecting a 
$50 million fraud would be 𝜋 = 50%. As we vary the minimum 
required power, we necessarily change the required confidence level, CL*. 
Increases in minimum required power will lead to reduced CL* values, and 
vice-versa.  
To illustrate, suppose we decide that the minimum required power for 
detecting a $50 million fraud need be only 𝜋 = 30%, rather than 50%. 
For a company worth $5 billion, the policy-salient event effect magnitude is 
thus 𝛾∗ = 1%. This is one unit of standard deviation for a low-volatility 
firm (σ=1%), but only a third of a unit of standard deviation for a high-
volatility firm (σ=3%). Accordingly, any given confidence level will 
correspond to lower power for the high-volatility firm than for the low-
volatility firm. When the true effect is 𝛾∗ = 1%, power of 𝜋 = 30% is 
achieved with a confidence level of 94% for a low-volatility firm—
essentially the typical current practice. But for a high-volatility firm (𝜎 =
3%), power of 𝜋 = 30% is achieved only if the confidence level is 
CL=80%, so that the plaintiff faces a less demanding standard,144 though it 
is more demanding than the CL=63% value we saw with minimum required 
power of 𝜋 = 50%. 
We have also held the policy-salient magnitude of fraud and market 
capitalization value constant, which together imply that the effect size γ* is 
constant. Suppose we hold the policy-salient magnitude of fraud constant 
but consider a firm with a lower market capitalization, e.g., $2.5 billion 
rather than $5 billion. When it is expressed in percentage terms, the policy-
relevant event effect magnitude of interest is γ*=2% rather than 1%. An 
increase in 𝛾 allows a higher (more demanding) confidence level at the 
same minimum required power of 𝜋 = 50%. For a high-volatility firm 
(𝜎 = 3%), the confidence level is CL*=75%. For a low-volatility firm (𝜎 =
1%), the confidence level is CL*=98%. Notice that this is a more 
demanding standard than would be required using the conventional 
approach.  
 
 
of its stock-return distribution is 3 times the corresponding percentile for the standard normal 
distribution, i.e., 3% × 𝑧 . = 3% × −
%
%
= −1%, i.e., the threshold is again a price 
drop of 1% for the high-volatility firm. 
144 With a confidence level of 80%, the high-volatility firm’s threshold value for 
rejecting the null hypothesis becomes roughly a 2.6% drop in stock price, rather than the 
threshold drop of 4.9% using a confidence level of 95%. 
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C.  Adopting the Method to Account for Non-Normality 
 
One complication for the method in Part IV.B is that abnormal returns 
typically do not have a normal distribution. We flagged this point in Part II. 
If the SEC adopted our proposal, it would need to account for non-
normality of abnormal returns. This section shows how. The discussion here 
is unavoidably technical, and readers may reasonably skip this section. 
The importance of normality is a well-known fact from probability 
theory: The shape of the abnormal returns probability distribution is entirely 
determined by the level of volatility, 𝜎. This turns out to mean that the 
threshold for finding statistical significance depends only on the confidence 
level and the volatility, σ. When abnormal returns have a non-normal 
distribution, the abnormal returns distribution cannot be fully summarized 
using 𝜎, so the threshold for finding statistical significance depends on the 
confidence level and the full shape of the abnormal returns distribution. In 
other words, if we call the abnormal returns distribution 𝐹, the threshold for 
statistical significance is now written 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝐶𝐿, 𝐹). 
Although it requires some different notation, non-normality is not an 
impediment to our method. It can be shown that there is still a definite, and 
useful, mathematical relationship between power (𝜋), the confidence level 
(𝐶𝐿), the event effect magnitude (𝛾), and the abnormal returns distribution 
(now characterized as 𝐹 rather than summarized with 𝜎).145 
By using this relationship, we can determine the confidence level value 
implied when the SEC sets the policy-salient event effect and minimum 
required power. Let 𝐴𝑅(𝑝) be the 𝑝-quantile of the abnormal return 
distribution, which means that the fraction 𝑝 of abnormal returns are less 
than the value 𝐴𝑅(𝑝). Then given the SEC’s choice of minimum required 
power 𝜋  for the policy-salient event effect magnitude 𝛾∗, the required 
confidence level is given by the equation146 
 
145 Written in terms of the significance level 𝛼, this relationship is 
𝜋 = 𝐹(𝐴𝑅(𝛼) + 𝛾), 
where 𝐴𝑅(𝑝) is the 𝑝th quantile of the abnormal return distribution 𝐹, i.e., the fraction 𝑝 of 
randomly drawn abnormal returns are less than 𝐴𝑅(𝑝). Thus, the fraction 𝛼 of abnormal 
returns are less than 𝐴𝑅(𝛼).  
The relationship in supra note 89 for the normal distribution case is a special case of this 
relationship. To see this, observe that when the abnormal return distribution 𝐹 is normal with 
standard deviation 𝜎, as assumed above, 𝐴𝑅(𝛼) = 𝜎𝑧 , where 𝑧  is the 𝛼 quantile of the 
standard normal distribution. Then power is 𝐹(𝜎𝑧 + 𝛾), and it can be shown that this is the 
same as Φ 𝑧 + , where Φ is once again the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution. 
146 In general, it can be shown using the equation in the previous footnote that 
𝛼 = 𝐹(𝐴𝑅(𝜋) − 𝛾). 
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 𝛼∗ = 𝐹 𝐴𝑅 𝜋 − 𝛾∗ . 
 
Once it has chosen a policy-salient event effect magnitude 𝛾∗ and a 
corresponding minimum required power 𝜋 , the SEC can determine the 
required significance level 𝛼∗ using the following procedure: 
 
(1) Compute the 𝜋 -quantile of the abnormal return distribution, 
𝐴𝑅 𝜋 . 
(2) Subtract the policy-salient event effect 𝛾∗ from this quantile. 
(3) Set 𝛼∗ equal to the share of abnormal return observations that 
can be expected to have a value less than the difference from 
step (2).  
(4) The required confidence level 𝐶𝐿∗ is thus the 100% minus 𝛼∗ 
(with the latter being formatted in percentage terms, e.g., if 𝛼∗ =
0.16, we have 𝐶𝐿∗ = 100% − 16% = 84%). 
 
Although this might seem different from the procedure we defined in 
Part IV.B, the two are closely linked. When abnormal returns follow a 
normal distribution, knowing the standard deviation of the abnormal return 
distribution is enough to determine any quantile of that distribution.147 That 
fact means that the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns tells us all 
we need to know to determine the required significance level 𝛼∗. Thus, this 
procedure is simply a more general version of the one we introduced in Part 
IV.B; the additional generality allows us to account for non-normality in the 
shape of the abnormal return distribution. 
Our more general procedure requires that we estimate (i) the abnormal 
return distribution quantile 𝐴𝑅(𝜋 ) and (ii) the share of abnormal returns 
that can be expected to have a value less than the difference 𝐴𝑅 𝜋 −
𝛾∗. Both quantities in (i) and (ii) may be estimated validly using the set of 
 
This follows because (i) that equation may be rewritten as 𝐴𝑅(𝛼) = 𝐹 (𝜋) − 𝛾, and (ii) the 
cumulative distribution function and the quantile function are inverses, so that 𝐹 𝐴𝑅(𝛼) =
𝛼 and 𝐹 (𝜋) = 𝐴𝑅(𝜋). The version of this equation in the text then follows by setting 𝜋 =
𝜋  and 𝛾 = 𝛾∗, and then denoting the resulting significance level 𝛼∗. 
147 When abnormal returns are normally distributed, their quantiles necessarily satisfy 
the relationship 𝐴𝑅(𝑝) = 𝜎𝑧 , where 𝑧  is the 𝑝-quantile of the standard normal distribution 
(i.e., the normal distribution having mean 0 and standard deviation 1). This is a general 
property of the normal distribution having mean 0 and standard deviation 𝜎.  
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estimates of abnormal returns from the estimated regression on which the 
event study is based, i.e., they may be estimated validly using the set of 𝐴𝑅 
values we defined in Part II.A.148 
This discussion shows that it is practical to implement our proposed 
approach without assuming that abnormal returns are normally distributed. 
This is important given the extensive evidence indicating that abnormal 
returns are not, generally, normally distributed.149 The discussion shows 
that all we need is the ability to estimate a sample quantile of the abnormal 
return distribution, together with the value of the abnormal return 
distribution at a particular point, which can be done using estimated 
abnormal return values from the event study regression model.150  
 
D.  Discussion of Our Proposed Method 
 
The method we suggest in Parts IV.B and IV.C started with the 
assumption that the SEC chooses a policy-salient event effect dollar 
 
148 By “validly estimated,” we mean “consistently estimated,” which means that in a 
large enough sample the estimated value can be expected to be very close to the true value. 
As discussed in Gelbach, et al., supra note 69, the quantile 𝐴𝑅(𝑝) may be consistently 
estimated by first sorting all the estimated 𝐴𝑅 values and then finding the lowest-valued one 
that has at least the fraction 𝑝 of observations below it; call this value, 𝐴𝑅(𝑝). Thus, we 
estimate the quantile 𝐴𝑅(𝜋 ) using 𝐴𝑅(𝜋 ), which provides the first quantity described 
in the text above. 
The second quantity we must estimate is 𝐹(𝐴𝑅(𝜋 ) − 𝛾∗). Even if we do not know 
the true abnormal return distribution 𝐹, we may validly estimate it using the set of estimated 
residuals, 𝐴𝑅. This is based on the empirical distribution function, 𝐹, which is the 
distribution of the observed estimated abnormal returns 𝐴𝑅. A result known as the Glivenko-
Cantelli theorem implies that the share of 𝐴𝑅 values that are less than 𝑥—written 𝐹(𝑥)—is 
a valid estimate of the share of actual abnormal returns with values less than 𝑥, which is 
written 𝐹(𝑥). Thus, if we knew the 𝜋  quantile 𝐴𝑅(𝜋 ), we could estimate the second 
needed quantity using 𝐹(𝐴𝑅(𝜋 ) − 𝛾∗), which is the share of estimated abnormal returns, 
𝐴𝑅, that have value less than 𝐴𝑅(𝜋 ) − 𝛾∗. In practice we do not know 𝐴𝑅(𝜋 ). We 
can solve this problem by first consistently estimating the quantile 𝐴𝑅(𝜋 ) as described 
above, and then plugging the estimate into our function, so that we use 𝐹(𝐴𝑅(𝜋 ) − 𝛾∗) 
to estimate 𝐹(𝐴𝑅(𝜋 ) − 𝛾∗). This can be shown to be a consistent estimator. 
149 See Gelbach, et al., supra note 69. 
150 We note that the discussion in this Part points the way to addressing concerns that 
Fisch et al., supra note 7 raise about how experts compute the threshold abnormal return 
value for rejecting the null hypothesis. In particular, the approach could easily be adopted to 
allow for dynamic changes in volatility, using, e.g., the GARCH approach that Fisch et al. 
suggest. All this method requires is an approach that allows consistent estimation of the 
abnormal return distribution. Thus, it may be applied to virtually any appropriately designed 
event study. An implication is that it may be implemented using a data-driven approach to 
determining which firms are used to construct a peer-firm index used as a regressor in the 
event study regression model; see Baker & Gelbach, supra note 62.  
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magnitude. Given the defendant firm’s market capitalization, this 
determines a value of 𝛾∗. Once the SEC chooses a minimum acceptable 
power level, 𝜋 , the confidence level, CL*, can be calculated (given the 
defendant firm’s volatility level, σ). This is true because of the direct 
mathematical relationship between power, confidence level, effect 
magnitude, and volatility.151 
Our suggested approach effectively reverses the conventional 
hypothesis testing method of starting with a confidence level of 95% and 
letting the chips fall where they may with respect to power.  Instead, it starts 
with power and allows it to determine the confidence level. But unlike the 
conventional hypothesis testing method, our method is not arbitrary. The 
conventional approach of using a 95% confidence level is not based on the 
determination that this confidence level satisfies a particular policy 
objective. By contrast, our approach asks the SEC to reflect on its policy 
goals and then to announce a standard of evidence consistent with those 
goals. 
We emphasize that our approach has the twin implementation virtues of 
flexibility and objectivity. The approach is flexible because it allows the 
required confidence level CL* to vary with the characteristics of the 
defendant firm. For defendants with lower market capitalization, a given 
policy-salient event effect will imply a greater value of 𝛾∗, which allows a 
given power level to be achieved using a higher confidence level. Similarly, 
the required confidence level will vary with the structure of firms’ abnormal 
return distributions.152  Further, as we discussed in Part IV.B, the SEC can 
use its experience and data to make appropriate choices about policy-salient 
event effect magnitudes and minimum required power in whole classes of 
cases based on firms’ market capitalization, volatility, or other 
characteristics.  Thus if it adopted our approach, the SEC would be using a 
standard of evidence that responds flexibly—and desirably—to the facts of 
the case. 
We claim the virtue of objectivity as well, at least in part. The method 
requires two pieces of case-specific information: the defendant firm’s 
market value and the structure of the defendant firm’s abnormal return 
distribution. There is little basis to question the objectivity of market 
capitalization, because it can be determined from public stock prices. To the 
extent that one might argue over whether market value should be 
determined using pre- or post-event data, the SEC could answer that 
 
151 See supra note 89 for this mathematical relationship. 
152 This is true whether one assumes normality, so that the standard deviation σ is 
sufficient to capture the structure of the abnormal return distribution, or whether one instead 
takes the more flexible approach to the abnormal return distribution in Part IV.C. Both 
approaches amount to estimating a firm-specific abnormal return distribution. 
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question as part of its rulemaking. There is more scope for argument over 
the structure of the defendant firm’s abnormal return distribution, because 
this must be estimated by experts.153 If there turned out to be substantial 
within-case argument by parties over the value of 𝜎, the SEC could also 
announce standards for the conduct of event studies.154 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Event studies are a virtual necessity in securities litigation. The typical 
study used by an expert witness employs a 95% confidence level to test for 
statistical significance, for no reason other than scholarly convention: That 
is what those writing in the academic literature do. As a positive matter, this 
represents a disconnect with legal standards of proof. As a normative 
matter, it may cause courts to reject cases much more often than would be 
beneficial.  
In this paper, we demonstrate why that is the case, extending the nascent 
literature showing why event-study standard operating procedure can be 
problematic in securities litigation. We then argue that the SEC, rather than 
courts or Congress, should develop litigation standards designed 
specifically to trade off Type I and Type II error rates—equivalently, 
confidence level and power. Finally, we offer a novel and feasible 
framework that the SEC might implement. This approach is based on 
ensuring that a minimum level of power is obtained for a benchmark fraud 
magnitude. Given knowledge of the defendant firm’s market capitalization 
and abnormal returns distribution, it is straightforward to determine the 
maximum confidence level (minimum significance level) consistent with 
the minimum required power of detecting a fraud of the benchmark 
magnitude.  
 
 
153 Again, this is true whether the normality assumption is maintained or not. Either way, 
the firm’s abnormal return distribution is estimated on the basis of the results of an expert’s 
econometric event study. 
154 See Baker & Gelbach, supra note 62 for suggestions along those lines. 
